Saturday, November 24. 2007
Ira Katznelson: When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold
History of Racial Inequality in Twentieth-Century America
(2005; paperback, 2006, WW Norton)
I picked out this book after reading Paul Krugman's The
Conscience of a Liberal. Krugman's theme is how the New Deal,
in response to the Great Depression and World War II, led to a
significant degree of income equalization in the US, both lifting
many working class people out of poverty and reducing the after-tax
income of the very rich. Of course, it didn't always work out like
that, and this is another side of the story. Katznelson details how
New Deal programs were designed to exclude blacks and how those
programs that built a politically significant middle class also
had the effect of increasing the economic disparity between whites
and blacks. The other piece of this story, which Krugman alludes
to and Katznelson describes in more detail without drawing much
in the way of conclusions is how white racism, starting with the
strategies southern Democrats developed to preserve segregation
in face of federal "affirmative action" programs, enabled the
conservative Republic ascendency that has dominated Washington
from Reagan to Bush, persistently eating away at New Deal and
Great Society programs while restoring income inequities to
levels not seen since the Gilded Ages. The key event there was
the support of southern Democrats for Taft-Hartley, undermining
an organized labor movement that threatened to organize low-wage
southern blacks, and ultimately damaging the Democratic party
by marginalizing its labor supporters. Of course, by then the
white southern Democrats had mostly switched to the Republican
party.
(pp. 22-23):
The South's representatives built ramparts within the policy
initiatives of the New Deal and the Fair Deal to safeguard their
region's social organization. They accomplished this aim by making the
most of their disproportionate numbers on committees, by their close
acquaintance with legislative rules and procedures, and by exploiting
the gap between the intensity of their feeling and the relative
indifference of their fellow members of Congress.
They used three mechanisms. First, whenever the nature of the
legislation permitted, they sought to leave out as many African
Americans as they could. They achieved this not by inscribing race
into law but by writing provisions that, in Robert Lieberman's
language, were racially laden. The most important instances concerned
categories of work in which blacks were heavily overrepresented,
notably farmworkers and maids. These groups -- constituting more than
60 percent of the black labor force int he 1930s and nearly 75 percent
of those who were employed in the South -- were excluded from the
legislation that created modern unions, from laws that set minimum
wages and regulated the hours of work, and from Social Security until
the 1950s.
Second, they successfully insisted that the administration of these
and other laws, including assistance to the poor and support for
veterans, be placed in the hands of local officials who were deeply
hostile to black aspirations. Over and over, the bureaucrats who were
handed authority by Congress used their capacity to shield the
southern system from challenge and disruption.
Third, they prevented Congress from attaching any sort of
anti-discrimination provisions to a wide array of social welfare
programs such as community health services, school lunches, and
hospital construction grants, indeed all the programs that distributed
monies to their region.
As a consequence, at the very moment when a wide array of public
policies was providing most white Americans with valuable tools to
advance their social welfare -- insure their old age, get good jobs,
acquire economic security, build assets, and gain middle-class status
-- most black Americans were left behind or left out.
(p. 40):
The South's political leaders thus had to find a tolerable balance
between two sources of tension. The region's poverty impelled them to
pursue fresh and significant sources of federal help, especially
because their states were unable to add much on their own. But they
had to keep payments low and racially differentiated so as not to
upset their low-wage economy, anger employers, or unsettle race
relations. The key decision was an agreement by the southern
supporters of the New Deal not to pay relief at a level higher than
prevailing local standards. They also secured such accommodations as
excluding agricultural workers from relief rolls at planting and
harvesting times. Furthermore, they had to manage the strain that
potentially might be placed on local practices by investing authority
in federal bureaucracies. "With our local policies dictated by
Washington," the Charleston News and Courier editorialized in
1934, "we shall not long have the civilization to which we are
accustomed." To guard against this outcome, the key mechanism deployed
was a separation of the source of funding from decisions about how to
spend the new monies.
(p. 57):
An explicit legislative exclusion of agricultural and domestic
workers from New Deal labor legislation first appeared in the National
Labor Relations Act. To be sure, the original draft of the bill
introduced by Senator Wagner contained no such exclusion. In the
course of examining a witness in the Senate hearing, Senator David
Walsh, a Massachusetts Democrat, observed that as the bill was
drafted, "it would permit an organization of employees who work on a
farm, and would require the farmer to actually recognize their
representatives, and deal with them in the matter of collective
bargaining."
This possibility triggered discussion of the issue when the bill
was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor. Senators Hugo
Black of Alabama, who later would change his views about race and
segregation, and Park Trammell of Florida worked closely with three
non-southern Democrats representing rural states to report a bill
containing the exemption of agricultural and domestic labor in
precisely the form that would be included in the final passage of the
bill.
(p. 61):
During the Second World War, even this arrangement proved
unsettling to the southern wing of the party. Pressed by wartime
social change, southern Democrats shifted positions, moving to limit
the effect of the labor regime they had helped install. With
unemployment eliminated by wartime production, and with many blacks
entering the industrial labor force at a time when many white workers
were overseas, unions began to organize southern workers, including
many blacks. In this context, southern representatives feared that the
New Deal rules for labor and work they had helped create would
undermine the region's traditional racial order. As a result, they
shifted their votes from the pro-labor column to join with Republicans
during and after the war to make it more difficult for workers to join
unions and to limit their rights at the workplace. The country's
system for regulating unions and the labor market took on an even more
decidedly racial tilt. Politically, this shift by southern Democrats
would radically transform American politics, as well as labor
legislation, for decades to come.
(p. 69):
The tight labor market induced by wartime industrial expansion was
fueled by large federal investments, by urbanization, and by the
substantial development of military bases; this in turn facilitated
aggressive union efforts to take advantage of the legal climate that
had been created by the Wagner Act but previously had had little
effect in the South. In just two years, from Pearl Harbor to late
1943, industrial employment in the South grew from 1.6 million to 2.3
million workers. And many farmers and sharecroppers who experienced
military service or worked at war centers were not prepared to
tolerate a return to prewar conditions (during the war, one in four
farmworkers left the land).
(pp. 77-78):
The changes that the Portal to Portal Act wrought to the FLSA also
diminished the ability of organized labor to utilize legal resources
to protect workers' rights. The rules it fashioned are an object
lesson in the considerable difference that seemingly modest procedural
changes to public policy can make. The year 1947, the last before
Portal to Portal regulations came into effect, stands out for the high
number of enforcement suits filed in federal court (3,772) demanding
compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act, the most in any single
year before or since. This peak reflected a steady rise in such
judicial interventionism in the labor market under the aegis of FLSA
during the prior three years. Once Congress enacted its amendments
making such proceedings more difficult, the number of enforcement
actions plummeted, in 1948, by 72 percent, to 1,062. During the decade
following enactment the average annual number of suits filed was 754,
representing a decline of some 80 percent from the high-water mark of
1947. Further, as the overall legal climate for labor altered and FLSA
enforcement declined, the cooperation offered by many states in
enforcing minimum wages and maximum hours waned, especially in the
South.
When the impact of more limited possibilities became clear to the
leaders of organized labor, they opted to make three fateful moves,
all rational in this new context and all successful in the short
term. First, they reined in their once ambitious efforts, focused on
the South, to make the labor movement a genuinely national force. This
strategy now had become prohibitively costly. Instead, they opted to
focus attention where their strength already was considerable. Second,
they concentrated on making collective bargaining a settled, orderly,
and productive process, trading off management prerogatives for
generous, secure wage settlements indexed to inflation. In so doing,
they experimented with long-term contracts (such as the UAW-General
Motors five-year agreement in 1950), while limiting their scope of
attention almost exclusively to the workplace. Third, rather than
continue to fight for a more advanced national welfare state for all
Americans, they concentrated on securing private pension and health
insurance provisions for their members that would be financed mainly
by employers.
Under these circumstances, the South's political, social, and
economic structure remained largely unchallenged by organized labor,
the one national force that had seemed best poised to do so in the
1940s. In consequence, the emerging judicial strategy and mass
movement to secure black enfranchisement and challenge Jim Crow
developed independently of a labor movement that looked increasingly
inward and minimized its priority of incorporating black workers
within its ranks. Two effects stand out. First, the incipient civil
rights impulse rarely tackled the economic conundrums of southern
black society directly, focusing instead mainly on civic and
political, rather than economic, inclusion. Second, the unions'
potential to alter the status of the majority of black working people
profoundly failed to take hold.
(p. 101):
The 1940 Census had revealed that some 10 million Americans had not
been schooled past the fourth grade, and that one in eight could not
read or write. This, primarily, was a southern problem. A higher
proportion of blacks living in the North had completed grade school
than whites in the South.
(pp. 101-102):
Thus, in the midst of a war defined in large measure as an epochal
battle between liberal democracy and Nazi and Fascist totalitarianism,
one that distinguished between people on the basis of blood and race,
the U.S. military not only engaged in sorting Americans by race but in
policing the boundary separating white from black. Because the draft
selected individuals to fill quotas to meet the test of a racially
proportionate military and because they were assigned to units based
on a simple dual racial system,the notion of selective service
extended to the assignment of definitive racial tags. The Selective
Service system soon found this often was not a simple task. The issue
of classification proved particularly vexing in Puerto Rico, where the
population was so various racially and where the island's National
Guard units had been integrated. Even here, registrants were sorted by
race and the National Guard was divided into two sections. The large
number of mixed race individuals in the border states, the Creole
population of Louisiana, and American Indians offered other
challenges, as did ambiguous individual cases almost
everywhere. Embarrassingly, the Selective Service fell on blood
percentages, using racial guidelines not unlike the country's European
enemy, Nazi Germany. Ordinarily, the rule it used was "that 25 percent
Negro blood made a person a Negro." Nonetheless, Hershey made clear
that it would be unwise for the local board to disrupt "the mode of
life which has become so well established" when a draftee in question
had been passing as white. After August 1944, the system was
sufficiently overwhelmed that he took the decision, at first resisted
by Secretary Stimson, to accept the classification an individual
claimed for himself when a dispute over racial assignment came to
pass.
(pp. 102-103):
For Jews, in particular, the Second World War produced a shift in
standing that was quite radical. On its eve, "Jews were not so
confident of their prospects in America." During the period of
economic hardship, resurgent anti-Semitism, and grim news from
Palestine and above all from the heartland of Europe in the 1930s,
American Jews faced quotas on admission to leading universities,
markedly to professional schools, and a more widespread restrictive
system of anti-Semitic practices that impelled the creation of
parallel networks of hotels, country clubs, and other social
institutions. Before the First World War, most Jews had not sought to
enter crowded labor markets outside their areas of economic
specialization, notably in the garment trades. But in the interwar
period, as the children of immigrants sought to move beyond these
niches, they discovered high walls barring many types of employment,
in particular in banking, insurance, and engineering. Public opinion
polls revealed a great deal of skepticism and many popular myths about
Jews. Anti-Jewish expression often was unguarded and
unashamed. Enhanced Jewish visibility in economic and civic life often
went hand in hand with heightened apprehension and nervous efforts to
limits Jewish prominence, as in the case of the unsuccessful effort in
1938 by the Jewish secretary of the treasury and the Jewish publisher
of the New York Times to persuade President Roosevelt not to
appoint a second Jew to the Supreme Court.
In contrast, by the 1950s, Jewish Americans had achieved remarkable
social mobility, high measures of participation in American life, and
impressive political incorporation. Anti-Semitism had become
unfashionable, at least its open expression. University barriers to
entry became more permeable. Mobility from one generation to the next
accelerated as access to formerly closed occupations
quickened. Housing choices multiplied. Jews entered mass culture on
vastly more favorable terms. The war, in short, proved a great engine
of group integration and incorporation. Under arms, American Jews
became citizens in a full sense at just the moment that Jews virtually
everywhere in Europe were being extruded from citizenship. Jews served
as officers in the U.S. military as well as enlisted men in higher
proportions than their share of the population. After the First World
War, they often were classified with blacks as a racial minority. By
the 1940s, they were linked with predominantly Catholic groups to
compose the category of white ethnics -- a grouping that signified the
extension of American pluralism and tolerance.
(pp. 108-109):
The decision to take and educate these individuals with marginal
education was the result primarily of immense pressures from the field
for more soldiers, but it also had another source. Across the South,
white leaders, including some of its most vociferous racists like
Mississippi's Senator Bilbo, were insisting that black men be removed
from communities from which so many white men were absent but white
women were still present. "In my state," he told a Senate committee in
the fall 1942, "with a population one-half Negro and one half white
. . . the system that you are using has resulted in taking
all the whites to meet the quota and leaving the great majority of
Negroes at home." In these circumstances, he advised the Department of
War: "I [am] anxious that you develop the reservoir of the illiterate
class . . . so that there would be an equal distribution."
Leading civil rights advocates promoted this view because they were
keen to reverse the policy that had kept so many blacks who wished to
serve out of the military.
The Army's response was to create a massive crash schooling program
of Special Training Units. At the military reception centers,
organized into segregated classrooms, two out of every three of their
students were black. Once in place starting in June 1943, more than
300,000 inductees passed through this program. Half came from the
Fourth Service Command that recruited in the deep South. A high
proportion, 11 percent, of the new white recruits were classified as
illiterate, but fully 45 percent of the black newcomers lacked basic
reading skills. Schooling lasted twelve weeks. "Specially prepared
textbooks, such as The Army Reader, describing in simple words
a day with Private Pete, were used. Bootie Mack, a sailor, enlivened
the pages of The Navy Reader" The level of training was modest
(the ability tow rite letters, read signs, use a clock, deploy basic
arithmetic), but remarkably the great majority, some 250,000, were
lifted out of illiteracy in this brief period. Of the black members of
these Special Training Units in the first six months of operation,
fully 90 percent were assigned to regular units at the conclusion of
their schooling, a higher proportion than the 85 percent of
whites.
(p. 134):
The gap in educational attainment between blacks and whites widened
rather than closed. Of veterans born between 1923 and 1928, 28 per
cent of whites but only 12 percent of blacks enrolled in college-level
programs. Furthermore, blacks spent fewer months than whites in GI
Bill schooling. The most careful and sophisticated recent study of the
impact of the bill's educational provisions demonstrated no difference
in attendance or attainment that set apart southern from non-southern
whites. All on average gained quite a lot. But for blacks, the
analysis revealed a marked difference between the small minority in
northern colleges and those students who attended educational
institutions in the South. For the latter group, GI Bill higher
education had little effect on their educational attainment or their
life prospects. White incomes tended to increase quite a bit more than
black earnings as a result of gaining an advanced education. As a
result, the authors concluded, at the collegiate level, "the G.I. Bill
exacerbated rather than narrowed the economic and educational
differences between blacks and whites."
(pp. 142-143):
But most blacks were left out. The damage to racial equity caused
by each program was immense. Taken together, the effects of these
public laws were devastating. Social Security, from which the majority
of blacks were excluded until well into the 1950s, quickly became the
country's most important social legislation. The labor laws of the New
Deal and Fair Deal created a framework of protection for tens of
millions of workers who secured minimum wages, maximum hours, and the
right to join industrial as well as craft unions. African Americans
who worked on the land or as domestics, the great majority, lacked
these protections. When unions made inroads in the South, where most
blacks lived, moreover, Congress changed the rules of the game to make
organizing much more difficult. Perhaps most surprising and most
important, the treatment of veterans after the war, despite the
universal eligibility for the benefits offered by the GI Bill,
perpetuated the blatant racism that had marked military affairs during
the war itself. At no other time in American history have so much
money and so many resources been put at the service of the generation
completing education, entering the workforce, and forming
families. Yet comparatively little of this largesse was available to
black veterans. With these policies, the Gordian knot binding race to
class tightened.
(p. 145):
As part of the quest for civil rights in the Kennedy years,
affirmative action did not yet connote compensatory treatment or
special preferences. Rather, it simply implied positive deeds to
combat racial discrimination. Yet even int he early 1960s the idiom of
affirmation suggested more far-reaching possibilities. From the start
of the decade, Johnson seemed to understand what he would later say
aloud at Howard. Civil rights alone would not be sufficient. The
growing gap between white and black Americans demanded more. When
Johnson was designated in early 1961 to chair the Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunity, he privately advised the president that the
Eisenhower administration's non-discrimination clause for governmental
contracts should "be revised to impose not merely the negative
obligation of avoiding discrimination but the affirmative duty
to employ applicants.
(p. 147):
The Nixon administration, far from opposing these new measures,
expanded the policy by further applying the doctrine of "disparate
impact" (rather than "disparate treatment"). Seeking to embarrass
organized labor, and enlarge a growing schism between the civil rights
movement and white members of unions who might be persuaded to shift
their votes to the Republican Party, Nixon enforced the Philadelphia
Plan first drafted by Johnson's Department of Labor in 1967, which
required that minority workers in the notoriously discriminatory
construction trades be hired in rough proportion to their per centage
in the local labor force. Soon, one or another form of the
Philadelphia Plan -- a plan Nixon called "that little extra start" --
was adopted in fifty-five cities. When the U.S. Comptroller General
argued that this program violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
Attorney General John Mitchell rejoined that the "obligation of
nondiscrimination" entails taking into account the racial implications
of "outwardly neutral criteria" that might, nonetheless, produce
deeply unequal outcomes by race.
(p. 164):
The consequences proved profound. By 1984, when GI Bill mortgages
had mainly matured, the median white household had a net worth of
$39,135; the comparable figure for black households was only $3,397,
or just 9 percent of the white holdings. Most of this difference was
accounted for by the absence of homeownership. Nearly seven in ten
whites owned homes worth an average of $52,000. By comparison, only
four in ten blacks were homeowners, and their houses had an average
value of less than $30,000. African Americans who were not homeowners
possessed virtually no wealth at all.
(pp. 168-169):
Curiously, a series of forgotten early experiments in affirmative
action by the military just after the Second World War can help point
the way. Affirmative action for blacks began well before the term
existed. With millions of soldiers coming home but security needs
still pressing, the Department of War conducted a sober assessment of
the campaigns in Europe, North Africa, and Asia. The way race had been
handled, it concluded, had diminished the fighting capability of the
armed forces. Responding to the study, the military decided to raise
the educational level of black troops to improve their readiness and
create a deeper pool from which to recruit black officers. The Far
East Command established such a program, aimed principally at blacks,
to bring every soldier to a fifth-grade standard. Elsewhere, race was
used more explicitly to define eligibility. At Georgia's Fort Benning,
the Army initiated an educational program for members of the all-black
25th Combat Regiment who had secured less than an eighth-grade
education. But the most far-reaching program took place in occupied
Germany. Starting in 1947, thousands of black soldiers undergoing
basic military training at the Grafenwohr Training Center received
daily instruction for three months in academic subjects up to the
level of the twelfth grade.
Soon, the training center moved to larger quarters at Mannheim
Koafestal. By the close of the year, the results had been so positive
that a larger, remarkably comprehensive program exclusively for black
soldiers was launched at Germany's Kitzingen Air Base. All African
American troops arriving from the United States passed through the
program. Black units stationed in Europe were required to rotate
through Kitzingen for refresher courses. Once this on-site instruction
was completed, Army instructors traveled with the soldiers to continue
their schooling in the field. The participants were required to stick
with the course until they reached a high school equivalency level or
demonstrated they could make no further gains. By 1950, two thirds of
the 2,900 black soldiers in Europe were enrolled.
Military affirmative action worked. These men made striking
advances in Army classification tests. That year, the European Command
estimated that the program "was producing some of the finest trained
black troops in the Army." Soon, the number of qualified black
officers increased considerably. Breaking with the masked white
affirmative action of the 1930s and 1940s, race counted positively and
explicitly to improve the circumstances of African Americans.
(p. 170):
Beneficiaries must be targeted with clarity and care. The
colorblind critique argues that race, as a group category, is morally
unacceptable even when it is used to counter discrimination. But this
view misses an important distinction. African American individuals
have been discriminated against because they were black, and for no
other reason. Obviously, this violates basic norms of fairness. Under
affirmative action, they are compensated not for being black but only
because they were subject to unfair treatment at an earlier moment
because they were black. If, for others, the policies also were
unjust, they, too, must be included in the remedies. When national
policy kept out farmworkers and maids, the injury was not limited to
African Americans. Nor should the remedy be.
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