John W Dean: Conservatives Without Conscience (2006; paperback, 2007, Penguin Books)

Same John Dean who was White House legal counsel to Richard Nixon during Watergate. He acquitted himself relatively well (if somewhat belatedly) in that scandal, which left him in good position to write a book about the George W Bush administration called Worse Than Watergate: The Secret Presidency of George W. Bush (2004). This is his follow up, and it has in turn been followed by a couple more books: another on Bush called Broken Government: How Republican Rule Destroyed the Legislative, Executive, and Judical Branches, and another on conservatism, cowritten with Barry Goldwater Jr., called Pure Goldwater. In his introduction here, Dean claims that this book was originally planned as a joint effort with Barry Goldwater Sr., who died before he could put his name down here. The title contrasts nicely with Goldwater's 1960 The Conscience of a Conservative. While it would be nice to think that Goldwater would have had some scruples over what Bush has wrought, I have my doubts, and those only start with the probability that had Goldwater lived he would have taken no more interest in this book than he did in his own ghost-written bestseller.

Dean does his best to preserve his sense of conservative identity against the scandal of conservative reality, mostly by characterizing his opponents as authoritarians. The more operative word that no one uses is "neofascists": the "neo" merely dispenses with the no longer palatable racism of the colonial/imperialist era that went out of fashion after 1945 and the subsequent exhaustion of the British and French empires.

Dean opens with three quotes, notably Bob Altemeyer: "If you think [the United States] could never elect an Adolf Hitler to power, note that David Duke would have become governor of Louisiana if it had just been up to the white voters in that state." Also, Jonathan Schell: "The administration of George W. Bush is not a dictatorship, but it does manifest the characteristics of one in embryonic form."

---

Early US conservatism: a laundry list (pp. 6-7):

Conservatism is a movement with no Moses, although William F. Buckley is sometimes considered to be an analogous figure, as John B. Judis's biography of him, subtitled Patron Saint of the Conservatives, would attest. Buckley's support of conservatism's latter-day saints, like Richard Weaver, Frank Meyer, Friederich Hayek, Russell Kirk, and James Burnham, through his National Review, have certainly invigorated modern conservatism. Kirk and Burnham have always been the most significant among these formatives voices, although by 1986, when Russell Kirk prepared his last edition of The Conservative Mind, young conservatives were already coming to consider his work as "Old Testament" conservatism, and his once well-known canons of conservatism now reside in the dustbin of history. In retrospect the only things that tie all these early [conservative] thinkers together are a dark view of human nature, their strong dislike of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, and an outsized fear of communism. This is about as close to "classic" conservatism as it gets.

(p. 16):

Had conservative scholars of the 1950s conceded the nation's liberal legacy, and stated at the time that they were formulating a conservative philosophy based on a century and a half of history since the nation's founding, a legitimate conservative foundation could have been built on the American tradition. [George H.] Nash isolated the key question facing the conservatives: "How could a nation conceived in violence and dedicated to universal rights ever be called 'conservative'?" Political scientist Clinton Rossiter, considered one of the first neoconservatives, answered this question head-on, and unlike his peers, honestly, in his early study Conservatism in America, stating correctly that America's political roots were "progressive" and the United States was conceived out of "a Liberal tradition."

Dean presents a "glimpse of the modern conservative family tree" (pp. 20-22):

• Austriocons: after Ludwig von Mises.
• Buchanocons: after Patrick Buchanan.
• Neocons: centered around Weekly Standard.
• Aquinacons: after Reverend Richard John Neuhaus.
• Radiocons: talk radio cons like Rush Limbaugh, Gordon Liddy, Mike Reagan, Blanquita Cullum, Dr. Laura Schlesinger.
• Sociocons: like Cal Thomas.
• Theocons: "actually favor a more or less theocratic application of biblical law. Unlike Aquinacons, they reject natural law."
• Republicons: came up as GOP activists, like Newt Gingrich and Grover Norquist.
• Catocons: libertarians, after Cato Institute.
• Platocons: after Leo Strauss.

(pp. 23-24):

Given the rather distinct beliefs of the various conservative factions, which have only grown more complex with time, how have conservatives succeeded in coalescing as a political force? The simple answer is through the power of negative thinking, and specifically, the ability to find common enemies. The adherents of early conservatism -- economic conservatives, traditional conservatives, and libertarians -- agreed that communism was the enemy, a fact that united them for decades -- and hid their differences. Today's conservatives -- especially social conservatives, as opposed to intellectuals and the more thoughtful politicians -- define themselves by what they oppose, which is anything and everything they perceive to be liberal. That category includes everyone from Democrats to anyone with whom they disagree, and can, therefore, automatically be labeled a liberal. Another group that has recently been designated as an enemy is "activist judges," regardless of their party or philosophical affiliation. Activist judges are best described as those whose rulings run contrary to the beliefs of a particular conservative faction.

Antipathy to liberalism has been present from the outset of the conservative movement but it only became a powerful unifying influence in the early 1980s. Sidney Blumenthal, when still a staff writer at the Washington Post, concluded that "conservatism requires liberalism for its meaning," for "without the enemy [of liberalism] to serve as nemesis and model, conservative politics would lack its organizing principle." Blumenthal's observation, made two decades ago, is even more valid today. Leading conservative Web sites, including well-funded think tanks like the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the right-leaning libertarian Cato Institute, spend a lot of time and money criticizing or complaining with varying degrees of contempt about all matters perceived to be "liberal." Important conservative opinion journals, like the National Review and Human Events, see the world as bipolar: conservative versus liberal. Right-wing talk radio could not survive without its endless bloviating about the horrors of liberalism. Trashing liberals is nothing short of a cottage industry for conservative authors. Take the "queen of mean," Ann Coulter, whose titles speak for themselves: Slander: Liberal Lies about the American Right (2002); Treason: Liberal Treachery from the Cold War to the War on Terrorism (2003); and How to Talk to a Liberal (If You Must): The World According to Ann Coulter (2004). Slander< for example, contains page after page of scorn, criticism, belittlement, and bemoaning of ideas she believes liberal. Her books have also generated a subsidiary cottage trade in fact-checking her work, which has amply demonstrated that Coulter apparently considers accuracy as something that needs only to be approximated.

Psychological Perspectives on Conservatism: starts with a report called "Political Conservatism as Motivated Cognition" by NYU professor John T. Jost (pp. 29-30):

Their survey of the usage of the term "conservative" over roughly a half century revealed "a stable definitional core; and a set of more malleable , historically changing peripheral associations." While its core meanings were considered to include "a resistance to change" and "an acceptance of inequality," its peripheral meanings were more complex, because not only did they change with time, but in some cases they overlapped the core meanings. For example, the study found the peripheral focus of "conservatism in the United States during the 1960s entailed support for the Vietnam War and opposition to civil rights, whereas conservatism in the 1990s had more to do with being tough on crime and supporting traditional moral and religious values." In addition, the authors provide examples of people who became conservatives for reasons having nothing to do with the identified core meanings, yet who later accepted those aspects of conservatism "because of their association with likeminded others."

(pp. 34-35):

In 1992, as part of a lecture series at the Heritage Foundation, [David] Horowitz said that "conservatism [is] an attitude about the lessons of the actual past. By contrast, the attention of progressives [is] directed toward an imagined future. Conservatism [is] an attitude of caution based on a sense of human limits and what politics [can] accomplish" (emphasis added). In his response to the question being addressed by this Heritage Foundation conference -- whether contemporary conservatism was truly conservative -- Horowitz candidly answered no, acknowledging that today's conservatives are "rebels against the dominant liberal culture." In later updating his Heritage lecture, Horowitz wrote that conservatism "begins as an attitude, and only later becomes a stance," and noted "that conservative attitudes derive from pragmatic consideration."

Dean then comes up with a chart (p. 37), a 2x2 matrix with the vertical axis "The Modern" Dilemma" opposing Freedom and Equality, and the horizontal axis "The Original Dilemma" opposing Freedom and Order. The matrix products are:

• Equality/Freedom: Liberals
• Equality/Order: Communitarians
• Freedom/Freedom: Libertarians
• Freedom/Order: Conservatives

This section is largely based on a series of books by Bob Altemeyer: Right-Wing Authoritarianism (1981), Enemies of Freedom (1988), and The Authoritarian Specter (1996) (pp. 54-55):

Altemeyer's data provides additional information about the dispositions of right-wing authoritarians. Here are a few examples that provide further perspective. These have not been deliberately isolated as negative characteristics; rather, they are traits that authoritarians believe to be positive:

• They travel in tight circles of like-minded people.
• Their thinking is more likely based on what authorities have told them rather than on their own critical judgment, which results in their beliefs being filled with inconsistencies.
• They harbor numerous double standards and hypocrisies.They are hostile toward so many minorities they seem to be equal-opportunity bigots, yet they are generally unaware of their prejudices.
• They see the world as a dangerous place, with society teetering on the brink of self-destruction from evil and violence, and when their fear conflates with their self-righteousness, they appoint themselves guardians of public morality, or God's Designated Hitters.
• They think of themselves as far more moral and upstanding than others -- a self-deception aided by their religiosity (many are "born again") and their ability to "evaporate guilt" (such as by going to confession).

It is authoritarian followers who filled churches across the United States on "Justice Sunday" to lobby for right-wing judges in federal courts; who can be seen on C-Span seated at dinner tables, after paying ten times the cost of their meals, to listen to Bill Frist or Karl Rove give a speech at the Federalist Society; who are the well-scrubbed young people who join college Republican clubs, whose parents or grandparents are delegates at GOP presidential conventions. By and large these Americans have never been troubled by the execution of a prisoner, and there has never been a war in which the United States engaged that they did not support.

Conservatives Without Conscience (pp. 61-62):

But stated beliefs and expressed behavior often reflect the workings of a conscience. For example, social dominators freely admit on tests that measure moral issues of right and wrong behavior that such matters are irrelevant to them. That suggests little conscience, a fact which is often corroborated by behavior. Altemeyer noted that "social dominators believe that a really good skill to develop is the ability to look someone straight in the face and lie convincingly. Obviously, that person has no conscience." Nothing shows lack of conscience better than bold-faced lying. Altemeyer pointed out that lying, however, is not a uniquely social dominator skill; it is also easy for right-wing authoritarians to do because of their remarkable self-righteousness.

(pp. 62-64):

How can this paradox be explained? Right-wing authoritarians employ "a number of psychological tricks and defenses that enable them to act fairly beastly," Altemeyer explained, all the while thinking they are "the good people." To begin with, they have relatively little self-understanding: "For instance, they do not realize any of the many undesirable things that research has discovered about them." Second, right-wing authoritarians have very compartmentalized minds, and "they can just pull off a Scarlett O'Hara ('I'm not going to think about it!') whenever they want." Altemeyer found the fact that so many others are able to detect their hypocrisies while they themselves are oblivious demonstrates how effective they are at ignoring their shortcomings. Third, he said, "right-wing authoritarians shed their guilt very efficiently when they do something wrong. Typically they turn to God for forgiveness, and as a result feel completely forgiven afterwards. Catholics, for example, use confession. Fundamentalist Protestants use a somewhat different mechanism. Many who are 'born-again' believe that if you confess your sins and accept Jesus as your personal savior you will go to heaven -- no matter what else you do afterwards. (This is called 'cheap grace' by those within fundamentalism who hold its members to higher standards.) [ . . . ]

This analysis can account for how someone like the born-again Chuck Colson can go about his hatchet work on people today without troubling his conscience just as he did at the Nixon White House. And how Christian conservatives like Pat Robertson can openly call for the assassination of foreign leaders, despite the Ten Commandments that he holds so dear. It is as if these individuals had worn down their consciences with cheap grace -- a remarkable and frightening process.

(pp. 66-67):

Altemeyer discovered that the aggression of right-wingers seems to be not merely instrumental -- that is, expressed for some political purpose -- but engaged in for the pure pleasure of it. Torture is an extreme example, yet apparently authoritarians can find even that enjoyable, as the Abu Ghraib photos tragically illustrated. But on a more pedestrian level, he found it difficult for most right-wingers to talk about any subject about which they felt strongly without attacking others. This heightened level of aggressiveness has a number of psychological roots. Right-wing authoritarians, as we have seen, are motivated by their fear of a dangerous world, whereas social dominators have an ever-present desire to dominate. The factor that make right-wingers faster than most people to attack others, and that seems to keep them living in an "attack mode," is their remarkable self-righteousness. They are so sure they are not only right, but holy and pure, that they are bursting with indignation and a desire to smite down their enemies, Altemeyer explained.

When one examines authoritarians closely, their propensity to attack others by any means fair and foul is not surprising, for they are fundamentally fierce people. Yet Altemeyer's studies indicate that if they could see themselves as others do, which they are seldom able to, they might gain perspective on their conduct. Their blinders, however, help make them who they are.

(pp. 77-78):

One of the more colorful (and accurate) descriptions of the typical neoconservative comes from Philip Gold, who justifiably described himself as having "impeccable conservative credentials and long experience in the national-security field," as well as being "a grumpy old Marine (a former intelligence officer), who has grown infuriated with and appalled by the conservative embrace of disaster" served up by neoconservatives. Gold, a former Georgetown University professor, described neoconservative foreign policy wonks as "a new aristocracy of aggression that combines 19th-century Prussian pigheadedness with a most un-Prussian inability to read a man or a ledger book, and a near total lack of military -- let alone combat -- experience. Ask these people to show you their wounds and they'll probably wave a Washington Post editorial at you."

The list of notable US authoritarians starts with FBI czar J. Edgar Hoover (pp. 86-87):

Presidents, who came and went, protected the nation from foreign invasion; Hoover, who held his post for almost a half century, protected the nation's "internal security" from mobsters, Nazis, communists, hippies, and antiwar protesters. He intimidated (and blackmailed) members of Congress and presidents (about whom he gathered information); and he helped foster McCarthyism by feeding often dubious information to the maniacal red-hunting senator. Hoover influenced the Supreme Court by using background investigations to disparage potential nominees he did not like and to promote those he did. He also aided Nixon's efforts to remove Abe Fortas from the Court, and hoped to do the same (but failed) with Justice William O. Douglas. Hoover trained his FBI agents in the black arts of burglary and other surrepetitious skills, and had them employed at his whim. He was a racist who sought to disable the civil rights movement; he refused to hire black FBI agents; and he tried to get Martin Luther King, Jr., to commit suicide. He rigged the Warren Commission investigation in a manner that still colors the nation's understanding of President Kennedy's assassination. How many innocent people were framed by Hoover's FBI -- a prototype of authoritarian government -- will never be known.

The peak of Hoover's career -- the period when conservatives almost genuflected at the mention of his name -- was during his crusade against communism. Conservative historian Paul Johnson describes McCarthyism, in which Hoover was deeply involved, as a time "when the hysterical pressure on the American people to conform came from the right of the political spectrum, and when the witch hunt was organized by conservative elements." It was a time when Hoover preached a terrifying gospel about communism. His FBI hacks cranked out endless articles (regularly placed in national as well as local publications) and speeches (for FBI agents, members of Congress, Justice Department lawyers, and other government officials) explaining how communists, if they managed to infiltrate, would destroy the American family -- its lifestyle, its homes, its ability to provide food for the table, and even the time parents had to dote on their children. And because the godless communists sought to destroy America's religions, Hoover warned that no American dare lose faith in God, for should they do so, communism would fill the void, and this would place them in hands worse than those of the devil.

Second example is Spiro T. Agnew. (pp. 88-89):

At the Nixon White House Agnew had the job of currying conservative favor. Employing the rabble-rousing rhetoric of Pat Buchanan, Nixon dispatched Agnew to fight the cultural war, and the vice president delighted in unloading depth charges and assorted munitions assembled by Buchanan and others. In the fall of 1969, the war was escalated, and Agnew became the first high-profile conservative to go after the mainstream news media. For a half hour the vice president tore into the unaccountable power of the unelected newspeople, who decided what forty to fifty million Americans would learn of the day's events. Nixon later wrote in his memoirs, with some delight, that "at the networks there was pandemonium; all three decided to carry the speech live."

Agnew loved his work. "My mission is to awaken Americans to the need for sensible authority, to jolt good minds out of the lethargy of habitual acquiescence, to mobilize a silent majority that cherishes the right values but has been bulldozed for years into thinking those values are embarrassingly out of style." His recurring themes and targets were "avowed anarchists and communists," "elitists," the "garbage of society," "thieves, traitors, and perverts," "radical liberals," and, of course, the news media, whom he called "an effete corps of impudent snobs, a tiny fraternity of privileged men elected by no one and enjoying a monopoly sanctioned and licensed by the government. They are nattering nabobs of negativism." (They were also, for Agnew, the "hopeless, hysterical hypochrondriacs of history.") Agnew's avowed aim was "dividing the American people," which he called "positive polarization." He was delighted when he caused a ruckus. "I not only plead guilty to this charge, but I am somewhat flattered by it." Conservative media loved Agnew's authoritarian aggression as well. A Wall Street Journal editorial approvingly noted that "Mr. Agnew's targets -- the media, war protesters, and rebellious youth -- are representative of a class that has enjoyed unusual moral and cultural authority through the 1960s."

Phyllis Schlafly and Paul Weyrich also get sections, followed by the religious right's authoritarian followers.

(pp. 159-160):

Josh Marshall, writing in the Washington Monthly, was the first journalist to observe this fact about Cheney; the piece was titled "Vice Grip: Dick Cheney is a man of principles. Disastrous principles." Marshall had discovered that Cheney has made one serious mistake after another as vice president, although "in the Washington collective mind," he has the reputation of a "sober, reliable, skilled inside player." Marshall found that the facts belie Cheney's reputation, and he has made a consistent, and he has made a consistent string of "mistakes -- on energy policy, homeland security, corporate reform." Since Marshall wrote his piece this list of serious errors has only grown. Marshall attributed Cheney's ineptness to a career that has largely isolated him from the real world. As Marshall described it, Cheney is part of the "hierarchical, old economy style of management [that] couldn't be more different from the loose, nonhierarchical style of, say, high-tech corporations or the Clinton White House, with all their open debate, concern with the interests of 'stake-holders,' manic focus on pleasing customers (or voters), and constant reassessment of plans and principles. The latter style, while often sloppy and seemingly juvenile, tends to produce pretty smart policy. The former style, while appearing so adult and competent, often produces stupid policy." Marshall is also describing the distinction between a nonauthoritarian White House and an authoritarian operation.

An examination of Cheney's career reveals that it is marked by upward mobility and downward performance. For example, the best thing that Cheney did for Halliburton as chairman and CEO was to step down and help them get no-bid contracts to rebuild Iraq and federal help with their asbestos claims liability; Cheney's attempt to run for president failed at the conception stage; he was undistinguished as secretary of defense, and many believe he was actually disappointed when the cold war ended on his watch, and not by his doing; his years in Congress have left a voting record that any fair-minded person would be ashamed of; and he was way over his head as Ford's chief of staff, which resulted in the remaining Nixon staff's appreciating how good Haldeman had been in the job; and, of course, he helped Ford lose his bid to become an elected president in the race against Jimmy Carter.

Bad judgment is Dick Cheney's trademark. It was not George Bush who came up with the idea of imposing blanket secrecy on the executive branch when he and Cheney took over. It was not George Bush who conceived of the horrible -- and in some cases actually evil -- policies that typify this authoritarian presidency, such as detaining "enemy combatants" with no due process and contary to international law. It was not George Bush who had the idea of using torture during interrogations and removing restraints on the National Security Agency from collecting intelligence on Americans. These were policies developed by Cheney and his staff, and sold to the president, and then imposed on many who subsequently objected to this authoritarian lawlessness. It was Cheney and his mentor, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who convinced Bush to go to war in Iraq, which is proving to be a protracted calamity.

(pp. 167-168):

[Cheney's chief of staff David] Addington, who was in his early teens during Vietnam and Watergate, reportedly shares the view of his boss that "the executive branch was pitifully weakened by the backlash" to these events. One has to wonder about Cheney and Addington's motives in seeking to restore the presidency to what they believe to be its pre-Vietnam and Watergate backlash days. Are these men unaware of why Congress clamped down on presidents' spying on Americans? Have they not read the transcripts of Richard Nixon pounding on his desk to demand a break-in at the Brookings Institution because he wanted documents he believed to be in their vault? Could they be unaware of the record of J. Edgar Hoover's FBI when it had unfettered powers? Why, if the powers of the presidency are wanting, do they not go to Congress and lay out what they need, rather than violating the law to see if they can get away with it? Do they not realize they are calling for -- and are busy implementing -- an authoritarian presidency, unchecked by Congress or the courts? Have they forgotten that the underlying ideal of our democracy is the rule of law -- not rule by presidential whim? It is still not clear how far these men want to take their authoritarianism, but I cannot find any examples of authoritarians leading any government where the governed wanted to go.

(pp. 168-169):

As Bush proceeds with his second term, we have had some six years to observe him. It is abundantly clear that he is a mental lightweight with a strong right-wing authoritarian personality, with some social dominance tendencies as well. Bush's leading authorities are "his gut," his God, and his vice president. Cheney, it appears, knows how to manipulate the president like a puppet, and handles him oversized ego by making him believe ideas or decisions are his own when, in fact, they are Cheney's. While Bush does not appear to be a Double High, the vice president is a classic Double High, including -- among other things -- his "go fuck yourself" dismissal of those with whom he disagrees. Cheney is the mind of this presidency, with Bush its salesman. Bush simply does not have the mental facility or inclination for serious critical analysis of the policies he is being pushed to adopt.

This strikes me as too generous both to Bush and to Cheney. The policies in question are so dysfunctional they're easily within the range of the "mental lightweight," and his willingness to follow them doesn't show much evidence of having been coerced or cajoled, let along ingeniousness on Cheney's part.

Continuing (p. 169):

Bush and Cheney saw 9/11 as an excuse to indulge their natural authoritarian and conservative instincts. In so doing, they have brought out the worst in conservatism: They have justified and rationalized their increasing use of authoritarian tactics in the name of fighting terrorism. Without terrorism, George W. Bush would have likely been a one-term president; with terrorism as a raison d'être, Bush and Cheney's authoritarianism has not been questioned seriously enough.

(pp. 170-171):

However, journalist-turned-blogger Joshua Marshall has a remarkable ability to be among the first to spot developments in Washington, as he did in identifying the authoritarianism of the Bush administration. In analyzing a speech by Al Gore on January 16, 2006, addressing the Bush administration's remarkable abuses of power, Marshall wrote, "The point Gore makes in his speech that I think is most key is the connection between authoritarianism, official secrecy and incompetence. The president's critics are always accusing him of law-breaking or unconstitutional acts and then also berating the incompetence of his governance. And it's often treated as, well . . . he's power-hungry and incompetent to boot! Imagine that! The point though is that they are directly connected. Authoritarianism and secrecy breed incompetence; the two feed on each other. It's a vicious cycle. Governments with authoritarian tendencies point to what is in fact their own incompetence as the rationale for giving them yet more power" (italics Marshall's).

Continuing, shifting to the strategic use of fear (pp. 171-172):

Among the most troubling of the authoritarian and radical tactics being employed by Bush and Cheney are their politics of fear. A favorite gambit of Latin American dictators who run sham democracies, fearmongering has generally been frowned upon in American politics. Think of the modern presidents who have governed our nation -- Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton -- and the various crises they confronted -- the Great Depression, World War II, the Korean war, the cold war, the Cuban missile crisis, the war in Vietnam, Iran's taking of American hostages, the danger to American students in Grenada, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, the terrorist bombings at the World trade Center in 1993, and Timothy McVeigh's 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma. None of these presidents resorted to fear in dealing with these situations. None of these presidents made the use of fear a standard procedure or a means of governing (or pursuing office or political goals). To the contrary, all of these presidents sought to avoid preying on the fears of Americans. (It will be noted that Nixon is not included in this list because he did use fear in both his 1968 and 1972 presidential campaigns, and he continued to use this tactic once in office.)

Frightening Americans, nonetheless, has become a standard ploy for Bush, Cheney, and their surrogates. They add a fear factor to every course of action they pursue, whether it is their radical foreign policy of preemptive war, their call for tax cuts, their desire to privatize social security, or their implementation of a radical new health care scheme. This fearmongering began with the administration's political exploitation of the 9/11 tragedy, when it made the fight against terrorists the centerpiece of its presidency. Bush and Cheney launched America's first preemptive war by claiming it necessary to the fight against terrorism.

Ironically, Dean then trips up with fearmongering of his own, describing how the war has created "an incubator in Iraq for a new generation of terrorists who will seek to harm the United States far into the future."

In his "Afterword," Dean quotes Glenn Greenwald reviewing this book (p. 186):

The answer Dean provides is the shared hatred of common enemies. And their collective attacks on those enemies have become the conservative movement's defining attribute. And that is sufficient to maintain allegiance because, argues Dean, what Bush followers crave more than anything else is submission to a powerful authority as a means of alleviating their fears of ambiguity, uncertainty, and complexity.

Ultimately, as Dean convincingly demonstrates, the characteristic which defines the Bush movement, the glue which binds it together and enables and fuels all of the abuses, is the vicious, limitless methods used to attack and demonize the "Enemy," which encompasses anyone -- foreign or domestic -- threatening to their movement. What defines and motivates this movement are not any political ideas or strategic objectives, but instead, it is the bloodthirsty, ritualistic attacks on the Enemy du jour -- the Terrorist, the Communist, the Illegal Immigrant, the Secularist, and most of all, the "Liberal."