Paul Krugman: The Great Illusion. A gloomy take on the Georgia war, arguing that we take the threat of nationalism and war too lightly, as did cosmopolitan Europeans up to the eve of World War I -- a period like our own where globalization was more prominent and productive than during the following decades of depression and nationalist protectionism. Krugman writes: "And today's high degree of global economic interdependence, which can be sustained only if all major governments act sensibly, is more fragile than we imagine." As much as one would like to, one can't argue that the Bush administration has been acting very sensibly, at least in the lead-up to the war and the kneejerk propagandizing that has followed. In this regard, the most dangerous trend has been to treat oil supplies as imperial spoils, which in turn sets a bad example for Russia and China, much as Britain's and France's colonial possessions set a bad example for Germany and Japan.

Billmon: Anatomy of A(nother) Fiasco. Not on the Georgia war itself so much as the political maneuvering in the US that set Georgia up for the fall. In particular, shows how a succession of undebated, unreasoned, clandestinely approved Congressional bills set out to expand NATO all the way to Russia's border. And the list of names on those bills not only includes the usual McCain-Lieberman suspects but names like Biden and Obama.

Personally, I see it more as a case of the bureaucratic imperative run amok: The national security state is doing exactly what it was designed to do, but without any of the external checks and counterbalances that existed during the Cold War -- the war it was originally created to fight. The domestic political system, meanwhile, has atrophied to the point where it's simply an afterthought -- a legislative rubber stamp needed to keep the dollars flowing. With no effective opposition, the machine can run on autopilot, until it finally topples off a cliff (as in Iraq) or slams into an object (like the Russian Army) that refuses to get out of the way.

I see now that Biden has returned from his myth-finding trip to Georgia with the recommendation that we salve their wounds with a cool billion dollars in aid. Don't have the details, but Georgia had spent almost a billion on US and Israeli military gear that the Russians have just turned into smoldering junkheaps. I don't mind sending aid, but it's hard to imagine any investment in the world that would be more counterproductive than rearming Georgia. I'd also make any aid contingent on Georgia recognizing and setting up normal diplomatic relations with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, so it is clear where Georgia's borders are and that the grudges and ambitions are behind them. Unfortunately, the bipartisan line in the US is wedged in the Cold War.

Anatol Lieven: The West Shares the Blame for Georgia. As I was just saying.

Tony Karon: Russia Has Stopped Retreating: That's the Message for America. Sums up:

The Russian campaign was designed to signal an end to what Moscow sees as the humiliation of the post-Soviet period and the onset of a new strategic balance, which makes some of the threats brandished by Bush and Rice sound almost comical. Russia's action had jeopardised its relationship with the US, Mr Bush warned, and Ms Rice added that they would have "profound implications" for the relationship. Well, yes, that was exactly what Moscow was trying to do -- break the mould of a relationship that Russia no longer sees good reason to continue because it has required Moscow to accept being treated as a second-rate power that can be ridden over roughshod.

Andrew Bacevich: The Lessons of Endless War. A second piece excerpted from Bacevich's new book, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism. I've ordered a copy of the book, so we'll see. I watched Bacevich interviewed by Bill Moyers the other night, and there were a couple of things I didn't like. One is that Bacevich still sees a lot more value and need for the military than I do -- he's a military man, and still thinks of himself as a conservative, where I despised the military way before I started thinking of myself as a pacifist. The other issue is more technical: he makes a big point of criticizing America's materialistic way of life, arguing that we have to effect a change of lifestyle before the big political problems can be dealt with. That may be true, but he also argued that we weren't always like that, that before the Vietnam era the American economy wasn't built on domestic consumption. The latter point is untrue: the US economy from 1900 on, but especially in the 1950s and 1960s, was spectacularly driven by domestic consumption: single-family houses, cars, appliances. The difference was that before 1970 Americans were buying American products, including gasoline. After 1970 all that changes, except for the consumption habits.