Missed posting yesterday, after posting at least something every day in March.

Anne Flaherty: Military Feels Fuel-Cost Gouge in Iraq. AP article, noticed it in Wichita Eagle this morning. Reports that the US military is paying an average of $3.23/gallon for fuel in Iraq (about what we're paying here in Kansas), which given the Pentagon's penchant for gas guzzlers works out to $88 per soldier per day.

Some lawmakers say oil-rich allies in the Middle East should be doing more to subsidize fuel costs because of the stake they have in a secure Iraq.

Maybe they realize that the US isn't doing squat to stabilize and reconstruct a secure Iraq. Maybe they just appreciate the up side of free markets, which allows scarce commodities to rise in price until pain pinches demand. Bush in Iraq actually works both sides of this equation: adding to the demand while taking much of Iraq's oil off the market. Exxon Mobil doesn't flinch from taking advantage of the market. Why should Saudi Aramco? This is about the only positive payback the Saudis have received from billions of dollars they've paid out to subsidize US war aims, especially in Afghanistan from 1980 to when we pulled the rug out from under their buddies in the Taliban.

Tony Karon: A Teachable Moment in Basra. Summary quote, followed by a long list of examples (Somalia, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iraq):

The pattern is all too common: The U.S. or an ally or proxy launches a military offensive against a politically popular "enemy" group; Bush and his minions welcome the violence as "clarifying" matters, demonstrating "resolve," or, in the most grotesque rhetorical flourish of all, the "birth pangs" of a brave new world. Each time, the "enemy" proves far more resilient than expected, largely because Bush and his allies have failed to recognize that each adversary's power should be measured in political support rather than firepower; and the net effect of the offensive invariably leaves the enemy strengthened and the U.S. and its allies even weaker than before they launched the offensive.

That the US (especially Bush) can screw up so consistently and not incur the wrath of American voters just goes to show that the consequences of success or failure in the Middle East are relatively trivial for most Americans -- contrary to all those admonitions on how we can't afford to lose.

While the analysts -- at least the ones I bother reading -- are pretty much unanimous that the Basra offensive hurt Maliki (and the US) and helped Sadr (and Iran, diplomatically more so than because they have much of a stake in Sadr), it has led to a major purge of the Iraqi Army, with those who refused to fight the Sadrists out and much or all of ISCI's Badr Militia (the ones actually trained in Iran) joining in. This augurs for similar offensives in the future, which Bush will no doubt support as enthusiastically as he did this one.