Daniel Cohen: Globalization and Its Enemies (2006; paperback, 2007, MIT Press)

(pp. 35-37):

However, a principal fact disarms the theory according to which colonialism would be a significant factor in Western wealth: the colonial powers all experienced slower growth rates than non-colonial powers. "The correlation is almost perfect," according to Paul Bairoch. Germany and the United States, latecomers to the colonial scene, experienced faster economic growth than France or the United Kingdom; Sweden and Switzerland experienced faster economic development than the Netherlands or Portugal. Better, if it dare be said, Belgium saw its growth rate slow the moment it became a colonial power, at the turn of the nineteenth century. Conversely, the Netherlands saw its growth rebound upon losing its colonial empire. Similarly, according to Bairoch, "it is very probable that one of the reasons for the relative absence of the United Kingdom from 'new' industrial sectors at the end of the nineteenth century was precisely its very great access to colonial empires."

The idea that wealthy countries got rich thanks to the exploitation of raw materials imported from poor countries is false for one simple reason: rich countries themselves have long produced said raw materials. The fate of the developing countries was already sealed with importing raw materials became the norm for the rich countries. As Paul Bairoch explains once more, on the eve of World War I, while the developed world already possessed a manufacturing productive capacity 7-9 times the global average in 1750, 98 percent of metallic ore and 80 percent of textile fibers came from industrialized countries themselves. Energy production does not escape the rule either. Until the 1930s, the developed countries produced more energy than they consumed and released a gross excess, notably coal. The biggest energy exporter was, in fact, England, the first industrialized country. It is only due to the role played by Middle East petroleum after World War II that the scheme was reversed. Even in this case, it was not until 1957 that the United States became a net energy importer. Until World War II, energy self-sufficiency was practically assured in the West, whence comes Bairoch's formula that "rich countries did not need poor countries."

(pp. 76-77):

The simple lesson that Mexico is learning anticipates what China may learn one day: that a country cannot hope to prosper solely on the basis of the international division of labor. Just as yesterday the industrialization of rich countries was responsible for the South's poverty, the deindustrialization of advanced economies will not by itself create tomorrow's prosperity in the developing world. In order to grow, a country must become a "center" in its own right; that is to say, a place dense with production and consumption. Because the new economy gives rise to the illusion of a world without borders, it fosters the hope that the North-South tension is going to be resolved. However, reducing the costs of distance does not bring either people or wealth any closer. It tends, moreover, to heighten the polarity between the center and the periphery, in the image of the town center and its suburbs. Contrary to the Braudelian plan, according to which the periphery lives a "history [that passes] in slow motion, lives repeat themselves from generation to the next," the suburban life illustrates the novelty of the new world economy. Through the commuter railway or the movies, the suburbs of Paris, Cairo, Mexico, and China all evenly gaze upon the world. It is the world which ignores them.

(pp. 144-145):

The nature of intellectual property is entirely different. A song or a chemical formula is neither bought nor consumed in the usual sense of the term that describes the use of physical goods. These are ideas and not objects; they survive the various private uses made of them. When an idea is discovered, nothing stops everyone from using it if not intellectual property rights, such as patents or copyright. Whereas physical property alone makes the appropriation of an object possible, intellectual-property laws restrict the free use of something that theoretically has no limits. Deprived of an owner, an ordinary good is not consumable. In the case of intellectual property, nothing of the sort takes place. An idea can be used by everyone without contradiction, and nothing guarantees that a system in which all potential ideas would be protected by property rights would be efficient.

In principle, the best way to find a new idea with which to solve a given problem is to coordinate the research of those whose work in the area and, once the discovery is made, to put the result at everyone's disposal. The reference model here is not the market but academic research, which compensates the researcher while leaving the discoveries free to all. The intellectual-property system manages to do exactly the opposite. Competing teams researching the same topic (for example, a drug for a certain illness) do not share their knowledge, and once the discovery is achieved it will be the exclusive property of the one who first realized it. For the contemporary world, here is an extension of an idea articulated by Marx, a contradiction between productive forces (here, innovation) and property rights.