Friday, January 22. 2010What's LeftGlenn Greenwald: Blame the all-powerful left! Buried deep in this is the point I made a couple of days ago. I think it bears repeating (and repeating and repeating):
The main point of the article is the repeated charges, especially by right-wing Democrats like Evan Bayh, that Obama's problem is that he's fallen under the spell of "the furthest left elements" of the Democratic Party. As Greenwald documents, this is based on "exactly nothing" -- other than the idiot repetition of a line that strains credulity even when mouthed by Republicans. Paul Krugman: Do the Right Thing: At last reckoning, the Democrats still had a majority in the House of Representatives. A majority -- less than the official party majority, but still a majority -- have even voted for a health care bill at least somewhat to the left of the one the Senate voted for 60-39. That bill was in fact so "moderate" that it was approved by Lieberman, Nelson, Bayh, and others who repeatedly held it up. One had hoped that reconciling the two bills would have resulted in one slightly better than the Senate bill, if not as much better as the House bill. But now that the Senate Republicans are free to wreck any bill, that option no longer works. But what would work would be for the House to pass the Senate bill as is, avoiding the need to reconcile versions. All we need for that is for the same Democratic majority to approve the weaker Senate bill as approved the stronger House bill. Do that, and Obama will have something significant to show for all his mealy compromises and uninspired leadership. Do that and the Democrats can claim to have delivered the one thing their base wants more than anything else. Don't do that and all the House Democrats will have to show their base is that they don't have any principles, and America that they don't have any guts. I wouldn't bother lobbying any Republicans on this: all they've shown is that they'd rather break America than let the Democrats get credit for facing up to a major problem. But go after the Democrats with everything you got. Any Democrat who refuses to stand up for this bill doesn't deserve the party's ticket. Or the party doesn't deserve its supporters. Krugman adds this on his blog:
One more point: although I'd be happy to see the Senate bill passed by the House and signed by Obama -- if served up on a silver platter, he'd at least do that much, wouldn't he? -- it's not at all clear that Obama's habitual rejection of leftist proposals has done him any good. Maybe it's politically determined by the intransigence of the Republicans and the clout of established interests -- the health care industry accounts for about 18% of US GDP, and the finance industry for a bit more, and if you give extra weight for profits over the last 10-20 years you can add to those figures. But genuinely leftist proposals would in many cases have more resonance with more people than those who identify themselves as leftists: they build on a sense of justice and fairness, they hold established interests responsible for their transgressions; they are simpler, they make more sense, and they are more likely to actually work. To take one example, Obama's hands-off approach to Big Pharma deprived him of using one of biggest, most obvious villains in the health care costs death spiral. (Instead, Billy Tauzin came back at the last minute demanding even more patent extensions, threatening to withdraw his lobby's hitherto useless support.) But there are plenty of more examples: get tougher on the banks, deflect the deficit projection gibberish by raising taxes on the rich, get out of Afghanistan, and scale back the incredible waste that is the US Department of Defense. Funny thing is that if he actually moved left it wouldn't change the Republicans line one iota. But it would give him something to stand up for. Thursday, December 24. 2009Health Care ReformI, for one, am pleased that the Senate passed any kind of health care reform bill. Without the reforms it is virtually impossible for me to buy functional insurance at virtually any price. I wish the bill covered more people more affordably. I wish the bill did a much more aggressive job of tackling the critical problem in the system here, which is profit-seeking by virtually everyone involved. This has led to fragmentation and unnecessary complexity, to obfuscation and propagandizing. This leads patients to not understand when they do or do not need treatment, making critical decisions based on all sorts of things that should be secondary or irrelevant. This tempts doctors to give more or less or just different treatment than the patient actually needs. This leads drug companies to mislead us on medications, including covering up major harm. This has led to all sorts of things that have very little to do with promoting public health. Most impressively of late this system has done everything within its considerable power to corrupt political discourse. That anything positive has come out of it is remarkable. I've been thinking about the health care system for a long time now. I have some pretty straightforward ideas about how to fix most of the problems, and they led me to favor different solutions from the one that Congress settled on. Everyone likes their pet ideas, and I'm no different in that respect, but T.R. Reid's recent book is helpful in showing that there are actually many variations on health care system that all work much better than the one we have, both in terms of lower costs and better outcomes. In theory, I'm inclined to favor a "Beveridge Model" system like the UK has (or like the US provides through the Veterans Administration), where all services are government run. But the UK system tends to be underfunded, resulting in longer delays and fewer options than we are used to (assuming you have reasonably good insurance here in the US). Especially in terms of availability and flexibilty, it looks like the best health care systems in the world are in France and Japan, which use private insurance and providers, but regulate them severely, in effect squeezing the profit motive out of the system. This has led to great cost efficiencies in the systems: for example, an MRI that costs over $1000 in the US costs $100 in Japan -- a situation which allows Japanese doctors to order more MRIs and still save money. But the various systems aren't exclusionary: it's easy to imagine a UK-type system pursuing upstream supplier costs like the Japanese do. It's easy to imagine a Canadian system with adequate funding for specialists: in fact, that's what the US Medicare system does. Reid offers good and bad news on prospects for change in the US. He shows two examples of systems that were similar to ours (profit-seeking, out-of-pocket) up to 1994 but were then changed successfully: Switzerland and Taiwan. In the Swiss case, the main change was to require private insurance companies to refund any profits. Before the change, Switzerland had the second most expensive health care system in the world at 11% of GDP, just 1% behind the US. Fifteen years later, Switzerland is still second, still at 11%, while the US GDP cut has boomed to 17% and is still headed up. Taiwan did a bit more, and got better results: they adopted a Canadian-style single payer scheme. The good news here is that such change is possible. The bad news is that in both Switzerland and Taiwan the changes were pushed through by conservative political parties, preferring to compete with the left-liberal parties by adopting progressive change on their own terms. In both cases, the decision was arrived at not just politically but morally: in both cases, even conservatives agreed that equal access to health care should be a right for all people, not just for those who can afford it. Of course, that's not bad news for Switzerland and Taiwan; it's bad news for us, where even the Democrats have trouble articulating health care as a fundamental right, and where Republicans are nothing short of shameless. Not a single Republican voted for health care reform this year, despite the numerous deals that Obama negotiated with the AMA, the pharmaceutical industry, and other lobbyists, despite the fact that insurance company stock prices rose on passage. The Republicans have moved past their usual stance of sucking up to industry; on health care they're into pure ideological malevolence. So the near term prospects for conservatives doing anything responsible are close to nil. For a taste of Reid's book, look here. Matthew Yglesias: Mitch McConnell's Proud Unipartisanship. Quotes the Republican Senate Minority Leader:
And they say generals always prepare to re-fight the last war. Republicans remember how their intransigent opposition to Clinton's 1993 health care reform effort was followed by Republican wins in the 1994 congressional election, so they figure what worked then will work now. That strikes me as monumentally stupid, both as a political strategy and as a reading of history. The single biggest difference is that Obama passed his bill whereas Clinton failed to get his bill out of committee. Clinton's failure looked incompetent, then when he walked away from the bill like some embarrassing road kill, he gave Democrats little reason to expect more from him. On the other hand, Obama persevered, against tough odds, and he comes out of this with something to defend. At most, the defeat of health care contributed some moment to the Republicans in 1994. Their big issue was the corruption of Congress under long-term Democratic rule, and it was largely H. Ross Perot who turned the tide in their favor. After that they used every trick of incumbency to hang onto narrow margins until 2006 when their own corruption finally sunk them. During the 15 years between Clinton's failure and Obama's success, Republican intransigence and blindness has allowed a predatory health care industry to increase its share of GDP from 12% to 17%, during which time more and more people were unable to buy or afford insurance, bankruptcies proliferated, and the US sunk further and further on most international metrics of health. Those are costs that fall not just on the poor and working families; they cut into business profits and burden manufacturers, who in turn cut real wages and/or export jobs. Against these trends, the Republicans have done nothing, turning a blind eye to greed and a cold heart to suffering and fear. They've made a lot of noise, and worked themselves up into a frenzy, but it's all been negative, paranoid, surreal. Aside from their fanatic base, will anyone else believe them? Why would anyone else trust them? I'm not saying the Democrats have no problems. They have all of our problems: continuing pointless wars, economic rot, solutions that don't go far enough. But they can point back to the wreckage of Republican rule, which is all the more credible given that the best the Republicans can claim is that Bush screwed up because he was a big spending big government closet case. And they can point to their own pragmatic moderation, which gets real (but modest) results without upsetting the Establishment. The Democrats would have it made if the Establishment showed them equal respect, but even so, the Republicans seem determined to make sanity the issue the next couple of election cycles turn on. The last time they exposed their conservatism so nakedly was Goldwater. Paul Krugman: Simulating Single-Payer. A little economic analysis arguing that Hackerish health care plans, like the one in Massachusetts and the one the Senate just passed, approximately simulate single-payer plans: "just imperfect, somewhat inefficient ways of simulating the results of a single-payer system." This is basically the same thing as we get out of Reid, who shows time and again how universal coverage ("community rated") private insurance systems approximate the behavior of single-payer systems. You can take this as reason not to get too disappointed that Obama and the Democratic leadership didn't stick their necks out for a real single-payer system. On the other hand, the inefficiency is likely to be more than "somewhat," and the imperfections glaring. It all depends on how strictly regulated the insurance companies are, and how efficiently the market can be made to work. Up to now the key to profits has been inefficient markets: opaqueness at every stage, lack of standardization in billing, uncertainty in payments, complexity everywhere, monopoly rents nearly everywhere. There is a lot of room here for savings without sacrificing one iota of service, but I expect the interests to fight efficiency as doggedly as they've fought equality. Single-payer may not in principle be any more efficient than a well-managed private system like in Japan. But single-payer would be much simpler, and would show political will to make it work. And while it may not have been politically practical, the main reason is that leaders who know better didn't have the guts to go for it. Sunday, September 13. 2009More Health Care BooksSome other books that I've noted in my book prospecting notes but (generally) haven't explored further. Listed alphabetically by author. A couple go beyond the politics of health care to get into the practice, but I usually drew the line short of there. Some deal with suspicious public health issues, and some of those are suspicious in their own right. Some push right-wing or status quo-ist agendas, some ideologically (e.g., Cato Institute) but most with a financial stake in their scheme. A small number of more general political books are listed where they seem to be especially relevant (e.g., Rahm Emanuel's The Plan), but not many. I've skipped over most books published before 2001, except when they seem to have historical value. There were a rash of books that appeared during 1992-94 that are presumed hopelessly dated. There was a slight uptick around 2004, and again from 2006 on when it started to look like a Democrat might be elected president in 2008 -- although more than a few of those books were meant to ward off Republican agendas like HSAs and CDHC. I've added notes to some where I thought helpful, but have let most explain themselves through their titles. Several books have book page links. I've eliminated all of the superfluous titles (mostly MD) on author names.
The more I look, the more such books I find, although many of them seem outside the bounds of good taste or immediate relevance. Selecting a short reading list is impossible. I have only read 3 of these (the Bradley and Hacker links, and the first Atul Gawande), plus 7 of the 9 books I reported on yesterday (1 link was based on a review, one more on an excerpt). And I have a few more books on hand if/when I get time for them: Brownlee, Mahar, Starr, the second Gawande, Groopman; and I have Kawachi/Kennedy and the first Wilkinson on order. Reid's new book looks promising, and Rothman is a historian I've long admired tackling an important subject. Hardly makes me an expert, but it does suffice to cover much of the story. It also helps that I've read quite a bit of the background history and theory; also that I have more personal experience that I really want to think about. I've been thinking that health care would make a good subject for a case analysis in my book on how to think about public policy. The exercise of dredging up all these books makes me realize that there's an even bigger gap here for a book that can triangulate between the practice of health care, the business and politics around it, the social and philosophical concerns of patients, and the technology. Will have to think more about that. Saturday, September 12. 2009Health Care BooksI overheard most of Obama's health care speech the other night. I usually duck political speeches, but it came on during a break in the music, and I wasn't much enjoying the music. Seems like he made the basic case clearly, although he didn't go very deep, in large part because he's not trying to fix very much. I heard one peculiar round of boos, but didn't catch what occasioned it -- maybe that Rep. Joe Wilson flap. And I heard three or four more boos, clearly coming from Laura in the TV room. I agree with her that the only way to actually fix the system is to wring the profit incentives out of it and to restore a professional ethic of care giving, and that the first step should be to institute single-payer insurance. Obama's credentials as a progressive and for that matter his reputation as someone with a grip on reality were tarnished by his eagerness to make light of single-payer. He also came up short on two other key points: one is whether government can run programs that serve the people, which is really a key article of faith for anyone who professes belief in democracy; the other is deficits question, where the right answer is: we'll spend what we need to spend to provide everyone with quality health care, and if that's more than is in the current budget we'll raise taxes to cover it. But then, as I said, Obama wasn't trying to fix very much. And if he manages to make it possible for someone like me who can afford to buy health insurance but can't find any insurance company willing to sell me a policy, I at least will be pleased. On the other hand, lots of other people will remain disappointed. One thing for sure is that Obama won't be the last president to attempt to reform the health care system. Even if he delivers what he's promised, he'll leave plenty more to be done. Over the last few weeks, I read three health care books I found at the library. I've read more over the last few years, and have more on tap. The books are:
Some older books that I read and commented on earlier:
Malcolm Gladwell: The Moral-Hazard Myth. An article published in 2005, in part a review of the Uninsured in America book cited above. When I originally posted a quote from the article, I didn't bother tracking down the URL, but now I've found the piece online. Part of the quote deserves reiteration (the only thing that has dated it is that the costs are even more outrageous now):
I started assembling a list of miscellaneous books related to health care policy issues, starting with my previous book prospecting blogs. Wound up with a pretty long list, which probably needs a few more notes, so I decided to hold it back. Tomorrow, maybe. Tuesday, August 25. 2009Talking PolicySpeak Disaster BluesGeorge Lakoff: The PolicySpeak Disaster for Health Care. Useful and somewhat insightful critique of how Obama and most of those who more or less support him speak about the health care issues -- not that I'm not annoyed with the insinuation that it's all a matter of framing. The masses may only respond to political issues in emotional terms, but there's still something to be said for rationally figuring out the policy details. Of course, the left is at a disadvantage here, as in virtually all policy debates, both because we have some good faith in democracy and because we actually intend to accomplish something worthwhile. The right, with no interest in either, is free to kick our asses, but they've hardly been geniuses in this shouting match: they repeatedly come off as ignorant, hysterical, and mean, and in some ways we're best off just to let them destroy themselves. Lakoff has a knack for finding an important point then losing it on his first stab at reframing:
Morality isn't the right word here, but he's close. The basic fact is that if you can put a price on surviving an illness or injury vs. dying, that price would gladly be met by anyone able to meet it. It's easy enough to see that we value our own lives and most likely the lives of the people we love most more than money. Focus on cost runs against this instinct. (A curious turnaround, actually, since it is usually the moneygrubbing right that lectures us on how little we can afford to pay even for the most basic necessities of those most desperately in need.) That's why we should focus first on quality care and keep that from slipping regardless of cost, only secondarily looking at cost as an aid to being able to do more thing better. On the other hand, following Lakoff's suggestion and decrying insurance companies as deathmongers isn't even true -- at most you can say they are indifferent to deaths because their fiduciary responsibility is focused on profits. So, sure, we can do a better job of talking in this campaign, but what would help more than better branding and wordsmithing would be a better solution to the problem. In fact, a good start would be to actually understand the problem, which quite simply derives from the commercialization of health care. That part is simple enough, but the industry is so huge and varied that no one realistically wants to try to wring out all of the commercialization. The single-payer advocates are only going after the insurance companies, which is a big and pernicious target and one that could most easily be dispensed with, but that leaves the actual providers, who have plenty of their own problems. Arnold S. Relman, in A Second Opinion, wants to go further and reorganize the providers into non-profit PGPs, which also makes sense, but is a much bigger task, is very likely to be disruptive, and still leaves the drug and tech companies free to scheme. I'd go after them too, and I got a few more things on my list too, like information architecture, training more professionals, and educating people to make smarter health decisions. But more than all that, you need to get people to recognize that professional virtues are more important than acquiring money. The essential reform of the system is to get to the point where your doctor values your health more than his own pocketbook. That's not impossible, but it's pretty hard to do in America these days. Matt Yglesias: The Psychology of Health Reform. Back to reality, this quotes an article by James Suroweicki on the psychology of loss aversion, then adds a couple of points that are probably more important. I'll add that a key part of why the "public option" is so critical to those of us who think reform is not just a good idea but a dire necessity is that -- exactly contrary to so many folks on the other side of the divide -- we can't stand the idea of ever again being subject to a corporate bureaucracy where our health and welfare is treated as a zero-sum game. We at least know that even mediocre government bureaucracies in theory work for us. We can at least appeal to them, and it helps knowing that the coverage we need isn't coming out of their pockets -- it's actually coming out of our own, but cushioned by the fact that in a public insurance scenario everyone helps everyone out. Ironically, the other side is equally convinced that it is the government that is arbitrary and capricious, attributes which they may or may not also recognize in the companies. (Some may hold to the fantasy that a free market forces companies to respond to the demands of customers, but there is no free market for health insurance -- nothing even remotely resembling one.) This is one reason why the real debate isn't over health care: it's over democracy. One side insists that the government can never be trusted with anything so important as health care. The other takes a similarly jaundiced view of companies, except insofar as they are regulated by laws enforced by government. Moreover, it sees government as the only agency that can represent the interests of the broad public in a society that is otherwise dominated by business. The Republicans have tied themselves to the mast of Ronald Reagan's dumb joke about the scariest words in the English language being "I'm from the government, and I'm here to help." The fact of the matter is that whenever anything goes seriously wrong -- a hurricane, an earthquake, a terrorist attack, a bunch of bankers swindling themselves into a drunken tizzy -- even Republicans descend on Washington looking for a bailout. There actually isn't anything wrong with that: many problems, especially really big ones, are by far best handled by government. Health care is one of those problems, but if the Republicans admit it they'll lose their whole shtick. So they stick to their guns and suffer, their only comfort being that others suffer worse. Paul Krugman: Obama's Trust Problem: The news today (i.e., 5 days after this column appeared) is that Obama will renominate Ben Bernanke for a second term as Fed Reserve Chairman. Bernanke hasn't been as bad as a lot of Bush appointees, but part of that was circumstance -- he was nominated as a hawk against inflation, but he spent most of his term in a deflationary recession where his instincts were unneeded and could do little harm. On the other hand, past Fed chairmen have repeatedly been able to hold the economy in a death grip. If you're a president who is committed to trying to stimulate enough growth to actually improve the welfare of the people who voted for you, you'd think you'd want a Fed chairman who'd see eye-to-eye with you on that. Obama could in theory appoint anyone he wants, so why not come up with someone more in line with his programs and ambitions? I don't know what the thinking is here, but it sounds like Obama did this to reassure the banks and investors. That's what his team has done consistently ever since they took office, which is why we've had bailouts without any meaningful reform. Same thing has happened all across the board. Obama was elected as antiwar but he's presdided over business as usual in Iraq, an escalation in Afghanistan, and budget increases for the defense industry. The only other issue as important to his voters is a massive overhaul of the health care racket, and there he's made a series of inside deals with the AMA and PHARMA to cut back on any meaningful reform while the Republicans have had a field day with their unanswered hysterical nonsense. Obama's offer to drop the public option in favor of non-profit co-ops is one more example of his willingness to knuckle under. Krugman notes:
What's left of Obama's plan is a set of private insurance company regulations that would be better than the present situation but will almost instantly translate into significantly higher insurance prices, which will make universal care all that harder to achieve, and leave us in pretty much the same mess we've been entrapped in for several decades now. That may eventually turn into a make-work program for future Democrats, given that the Republicans have no ideas and no desire to actually address any real problems. But with 60 Senators and a big majority in the House you'd think now would be the time to do something. It's not happening, and a big part of the reason is that it doesn't look like Obama's fighting to make things happen or stand up for things he certainly knew before the election were right. Krugman again:
Time: Top 10 Health-Care-Reform Players: Just a list, but gives you a sense of the obstacle course.
Friday, August 21. 2009Health Care Debate Kansas StyleTwo things from the Wichita Eagle worth pointing out. The first is Richard Crowson's editorial cartoon:
Crowson was retired last year when the Eagle decided they didn't need original editorial cartoons, then finally brought back on a very infrequent basis. For more, see Crowson's blog. Also: Bill Roy: Health care rationed based on ability to pay: One of the best opinion pieces I've seen on the health care town halls. Lynn Jenkins defeated Democrat Nancy Boyda in the 2008 election, running as a "moderate" Republican (versus a rather uninspiring one-term Blue Dog Democrat), but since she got in her record has been indistinguishable from the other Kansas Republicans: conservative Jerry Moran and rabid fascist Todd Tiahrt (both running for Sam Brownback's senate seat). Roy is a retired MD who served two terms in the House, then lost two very narrow statewide Senate races against Bob Dole. I'm tempted to quote the entire piece, but here's just the start:
Read the whole thing. By the way, I've started Arnold S. Relman's A Second Opinion: Rescuing America's Health Care. Thus far, it is one of the best books I've seen on the subject. More on that later. Thursday, August 20. 2009Super MinorityMatthew Yglesias: Republicans Calling for Super-Majority for Health Care. I take it the political winds are changing. Maybe some of the insane opposition is blowing back. Maybe some of Obama's deals with the powers that be are bearing fruit. A while back Jim DeMint was saying that failing to deliver on health care would be Obama's Waterloo. Now he's saying that if he passes a bill without broad Republian support, the Democrats will never win an election again. Here we see Enzi and Grassley, who seem like rather arbitrary picks as the party's designated negotiators, pleading for a bill which only the 20-25 most hopeless Republicans will oppose. I think it's clear now that the Republican Party from top to bottom will say and do anything to derail any kind of reform -- a point made clear in Yglesias's last paragraph:
Friday, August 14. 2009Broken HipFrom TPM: Throw Mama from the Train:
Broun is getting ahead of himself here. Not only it he assuming that the government's going to health care at such a detailed level that they'll routinely overrule doctors, he's assuming that the Republicans are going to be running the government. Republican vehemence over health care seems to be coming from a deeper point in their reptilian brains than their usual desire to help rich businesses fleece poor customers. They seem to recognize that if government is ever trusted to run anything as critically important to voters as health care, they'll never win another election. One thing that is certain is that Broun's concern has nothing to do with mama. Preserving the status quo leaves these life or death situations in the hands of the private, profit-maximizing insurance companies. In fact, if health insurance reform fails, the private companies will be all that much emboldened in their search for profits. Wednesday, August 12. 2009Losing UglyFred Mann: Tiahrt gets warm response at area town halls. Similar reports on Reps. Jerry Moran and Lynn Jenkins. On the other hand, the sole Kansas Democrat in the House, Dennis Moore, called off his town hall meetings after receiving death threats. (Scott Roeder, the guy who assassinated Dr. George Tiller, resided until his arrest in Moore's district.) Tiahrt is the worst of the worst. People urge us to write to him, call, go to his events, but he's so far gone it's pointless trying to reason with him. I've seen him do his town hall thing, and it's a complete waste of time -- one reason he hears so little reason. Still, there is something relatively new here: his crowd is getting out in front of him, pulling even harder to the right:
In some sense this doesn't matter, because Tiahrt is already bought and paid for. But it's starting to look like Obama's has lost not just the fight but his political courage. It's hard to sell a bill full of compromises and loopholes designed to undo the benefits originally promised. It's hard to sell a bill when you yourself admit that something else -- single-payer -- would do the job better. Robert Reich: How the White House's deal with Big Pharma undermines democracy. As bad as the private sector health insurance companies are, it's not obvious to me that they are the biggest problem, either in terms of health care quality or excessive cost. Big Pharma is way up there, and the megacorp profit-oriented health care providers may even be further up there. The main reason I see for focusing on insurance first is that it not only solves a couple of major problems -- lack of coverage for people who have inadequate insurance and no coverage at all for large numbers of people excluded from the present system -- but that beyond solving those problems it provides purchasing power leverage on the rest of the system. The other nice thing about the insurance companies is that we don't need them at all, so cleaning up that problem should be relatively simple. On the other hand, the health care providers are needed -- the workers, anyhow, if not all the financiers -- which makes it harder to sort out. Drug companies are in between, but the problems can easily be separated out. For starters, rewrite patent law to eliminate monopolies and to regulate drug prices. More importantly, publicly fund research and development, and make all of the planning, procedures, and testing transparent, so you can put an end to drug companies spinning test results and covering up problems (cf. Vioxx). And put some strict regulations on drug industry marketing; better still provide transparent public forums for disseminating information about drug performance. One goal here is to make all drugs generic, reducing the industry to manufacturing. And make this system international, so that research, development, and manufacturing anywhere in the world is available anywhere in the world. Even with new investment in R&D, these few simple changes should result in savings of 50-75% of what is currently spent on pharmaceuticals. That in itself would be a big chunk of cost savings which would help out everywhere else. The same sort of thing can be done with any other medical technology. One big thing that drives up the cost of health care is that nearly all of the new technologies and procedures are monopoly-priced under patent protection. Which is to say that every new whizzbang development gets to ask the question: how much is your life worth? Most are marketed with ridiculous gross margins, the most successful ones becoming huge bonanzas. Public funding of research and development would if anything outproduce the current private system. For one thing, it would encourage competing groups to build on each other's work. Public testing would make it possible for anyone to spot a problem and come up with a better solution. One of the big hidden costs of the current system is liability: what it costs when a product does unexpected damage. That costs would get wrung out of the system real fast. Admittedly, private insurance has some easy cost targets too: they currently spent something like 30% of their gross on marketing and administration, whereas a single-payer system like Medicare only spends 3%. The difference could easily pay for universal coverage. But that sort of change is more than Obama will allow himself to consider. Instead, he's pushing a set of regulations on private health insurance which will make it less unpalatable but also more expensive. Then he's shackling those reforms with a requirement that they be deficit-neutral, which opens his whole program to charges that he'll inflict some combination of higher taxes and service restrictions. Cutting this deal with Big Pharma just digs himself a deeper hole. Personally, I would prefer an approach where we started talking about how the system fails qualitatively, then figure out how to improve on that, introducing savings only once we ensure that no quality will be lost. This means educating people pretty much from scratch about how it all works, and how it currently malfunctions. At some level Obama must understand this, but instead of tackling the problem head on, he keeps trying to skirt past problems by making deals with established interests. That's why he keeps losing. That's why it feels like we wound up with the Clinton administration we voted against. Saturday, August 1. 2009Government CarePhillip Longman: The Best Care Anywhere. This is actually an article from 2005, back in the dark (Bush) ages when nobody even considered the possibility of trying to do something to reform our mess of a health care system, but it's worth taking another look at now. It's about how a government agency carved off a single-payer population and provided them with a health care system with virtually no private sector participation. Free from the influence of private interests, the government only had to balance costs and benefits off. The result is the best quality, lowest cost health care system in America. That's what the Veterans Administration did. Longman went on to expand this article into a book, Best Care Anywhere: Why VA Health Care Is Better Than Yours (paperback, 2007, Polipoint Press).
This came about basically because of two moves by Bill Clinton: in 1994 he appointed Kenneth W. Kizer VHA undersecretary of health, and in 1996 he signed a bill to expand eligibility to all veterans, not just combat casualties.
A lot of details follow on just how this works, but much of it shouldn't be surprising. Most problems are easier (less expensive and more successful) to deal with when you catch them early, which became a focus. And health care is a team activity, so having one set of common electronic records both eliminates extra work and errors and lets everyone work on the same plan. They also took a look at evidence, identifying problems and checking what worked and what didn't. This is almost common sense when you're trying to provide quality health care, but it isn't always followed in the private health care system, where there's an overriding concern for profits.
Doctors write their orders into the electronic records system, and nurses check off every time they administer a drug or procedure. The system, by checking the patient ID and the drug/procedure, has virtually eliminated routine mistakes. Conclusion:
Of course, you don't automatically get superior health care by turning it over to the government. It also takes management skill, professional dedication, adequate funding, enough time to review cases and refine and improve methods. You could duplicate many of these methods with private health care providers, especially if you can develop a portable system of records and a system of reviews and accountability that can be shared everywhere. You also need to do as much as you can to isolate medical decisions from the profit machinations that inevitably come with private sector companies. (No one denies that profits are powerful motivators, but nothing is clearer than the fact that optimal health outcomes and optimal profit outcomes have nothing in common.) Public financing of as much shared infrastructure as possible would help -- indeed, would be essential -- with private providers. Open source software is one key element here: it makes adoption practically free, while keeping all of the technology transparent so it can be critiqued and improved by users all over the world. Freely published academic research is another. A single-payer insurance system would also help to push best practices throughout a private provider system. Lots of lessons here, but the most important one is that the pursuit of best practices and quality outcomes also works best as a cost containment system. In fact, it's the only cost containment methodology that doesn't sacrifice quality. Moreover, by focusing on quality first, we have an answer to everyone worried more that reform will diminish quality, as well as an answer to the bean counters. Friday, July 31. 2009The Midas TouchDan Eggen: Industry is generous to influential bloc. Uh, what was it I was saying about the Blue Dog Democrats and health industry money? Andrew Leonard: The worst healcare reform option: Doing nothing: Links to Ezra Klein on Bill Kristol, Jonathon Chait on Martin Feldstein, and a Bloomberg article by Matthew Benjamin and Brian Faler, which among other things cites an estimate that unreformed and unchecked health care expenses will hit 20% of GDP by 2018. (Again, think of the whole national economy being strangled and swallowed by a giant boa constrictor.) Conclusion:
Paul Krugman: Why markets can't cure healthcare. A brief primer starting with Kenneth Arrow's classic paper, "Uncertainty and the welfare economics of health care. This has been discussed many times before -- Robert Kuttner wrote a whole book on it, Everything for Sale: The Virtues and Limits of Markets. The bottom line is that there is no theoretical and no historical/empirical basis for thinking that the present problems of the US health care system can be remedied by any sort of free market approach. You'd have to be stupid and/or blindsided by money to think otherwise. Krugman has had a lot of good health care blog entries lately, as well as several columns, especially this one: Paul Krugman: Health care realities. Krugman has been a steady voice on this issue, and this column hits many of the basics: at least as regards insurance and the government, as good a place to start as any. Read it. If I started quoting, I'd quote it all. Nate Silver: Yes, the GOP's still out of touch. Quotes GOP Rep. Tom Price (R-GA) on how "nothing has had a greater negative effect on the delivery of health care than the federal government's intrusion into medicine through Medicare." Then does some polling, showing: 60 percent of people participating in Medicare rate it 9 or 10 on a 10-point scale (84 percent 7 or better) vs. 36-40 percent approval of private insurance plans; that 77 percent would like to see Medicare expanded to people aged 55 and older; that 58 percent would support Medicare-for-all (i.e., single-payer). That you can't find similar percentages in Congress is solely attributable to the influence of money there. Matt Yglesias: Health insurance industry's strategic bribery. Good chart here, showing how the health insurance industry has spread its money around. Sure, the rich have a general Republican bias, but every year most of the money went to the majority party in Congress. The majority party is, after all, the one able to make or break the legislation that all that money rides on. Second point is that the totals have been going up and up, expanding even faster than the industry's take of the GDP. No breakdown here between liberals and Blue Dogs. David Barstow: An Abortion Battle, Fought to the Death. Long New York Times piece on Dr. George Tiller and his struggles to keep his women's clinic open. Well on its way to book length. Barstow likes to characterize Tiller as a battler, one who fought back as much as he got. That's not really true. Tiller never killed anyone. Tiller didn't go around harrassing other people and their businesses. Moreover, Tiller didn't just provide abortions. He was a doctor who cared for his patients, even when carring called for performing an abortion. For the rest of us, he stood up for rights that in theory we have but that in practice are under constant assault. We make a big deal when soldiers die for our rights in some far away country. Tiller died for us, defending us against a much more real threat. Thursday, July 30. 2009Blue DogsIt occurs to me that the problem with the Blue Dog Democrats is, in principle at least, pretty simple. All politicians need voters to get elected, but they also need financial contributors, and in some circumstances the money is much more important. The Blue Dogs almost always run in districts that could more than conceivably be won not just by a Republican but by a really nasty one. That saves the Blue Dog from any real chance of a challenge from the left, no matter how lukewarm or wishy-washy the candidate is. That also means the Blue Dogs have a big Democratic loyalist vote locked in -- maybe less than 50% but close enough to build on. So base voters aren't much of an issue for Blue Dogs. What really matters to them is that the Republicans don't run real strong candidates against them, and what deters opposition candidates more than anything is a big war chest of money. One thing I think you'll find that Blue Dogs are real good at sniffing out is a lot of money. There are two basic political things about health care reform: one is that it's an issue that voters, especially in the Democratic base, really care a lot about; the other is that there is an incredible amount of money riding on the outcome (16% of GDP is one dollar out of every six in the whole economy). The Blue Dogs are taking positions that make no logical sense except for their determination to pay back their sponsors -- e.g., they worry about the costs of things they don't want, while rejecting taxes on the rich to pay for those costs, and promoting higher payments and profits to the industry. They don't worry about pissing off their voter base because they know that if they raise enough money they'll be unbeatable. Equations like this are one of the dominant features of US politics. It's always safe to be a Republican because the rich take care to support their partisans. The Democrats have had a tougher time with this, especially where labor unions have lost their grip. One result is that Democrats habitually look for candidates who can support their own campaigns. Another is that most rank and file Democrats and lots of non-partisans would put campaign finance reform at the head of any list of things to do when and if we ever get the chance. You'd think that with Obama in the White House and big Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress now would be that time, but I've yet to see them make any effort made in that direction. The top dogs in the Democratic party are there because they're top money raisers, and they get that money because they're good for business. In some cases that's not such a bad thing, but in health care it's deadly. There are lots of problems in health care, but the big one is that the industry has a boa constrictor grip on the economy, slowly, steadily devouring it -- 10% of GDP, 12%, 14%, 16%, any crystal ball into the future only shows larger numbers until the whole thing keels over and dies. If ever we needed to contain the interests of a select few to do something that practically everybody desperately needs it is in health care today. Thursday, July 23. 2009The Rich Will Always Be Full of ThemselvesMatt Yglesias: Poverty Will Always Be With Us Until We Do Something About It: Check out the chart, "Poverty Rate, 1959-2007": not only the big drop from 1959-69 coinciding with Michael Harrington's The Other America and a spate of Democratic programs trying to do something about poverty, but the roller coaster afterwards.
Aside from Nixon, who's a somewhat anomalous Republican in this regard, note poverty rises with the coming of the Ford, Reagan, Bush, and Bush administrations, and drops with Carter and Clinton. There is a secondary effect having to do with overall performance, which is why the latter half of Reagan's reign sees a slight drop. It's also likely that Bush II's bump has more to do with the economy than with administration policy. The chart is baselined at 11% because no one has gone lower. The drop from 11% to 0% would be more difficult than going from 22% to 11%, but the assumption that it's not doable says more about the mental blinders conservatives work under than anything else. I imagine there's a similar chart somewhere for the 1930s, a time when government -- at least after FDR took over -- was exceptionally proactive at fighting poverty. The conservative predeliction for inaction leads to all sorts of rationalizations, but the only proof they have to offer is their conviction, which looks pretty pathetic compared to what people who care and try manage to accomplish. Andrew Leonard: How to Upgrade Human Values. Comments on a paper by John E. Roemer, Changing Social Ethos Is the Key. I was especially struck by this, which is a line of thought I've been moving toward:
Conservatives will blow a gasket at this notion, but people change all the time. On the other hand, greed (for instance) causes so many problems it's easy to see how casting it into disfavor (as had long been done) is a simpler solution than trying to rejigger the incentives to make greed less destructive. Of course, with conservatives it all depends on who's getting helped. It's hard to find conservatives who objected to deficits used to fund tax cuts, imperial wars, and plain old patronage when Bush was in the White House. They may be convinced that government can't help the poor, but they work themselves into a frenzy every time the rich need government action to boost their bottom line. Andrew Leonard: Joe Stiglitz's Last Minute White House Party Invite. A different set of issues, but wanted to keep this link. Leonard quotes Michael Hirsh reporting on Stiglitz:
Friday, July 17. 2009Boiling FrogsHaven't felt up to blogging since I got back from my "vacation" -- wouldn't have had much time anyway. One thing I have been doing is reading about the Great Depression and Roosevelt's 100 Days -- Adam Cohen's Nothing to Fear on the latter, following Timothy Egan's The Worst Hard Time -- and thinking a bit on what's similar and what isn't. Started to write a note on Paul Krugman's Boiling the Frog column and his somewhat wonkier blog post on how Deficits Saved the World. One thing the latter shows is that the speculative bubble that caused our recession was as large and its collapse was as powerful as the one that caused the Great Depression. That we don't seem to be as bad off this time is because absorbed much of the shock, partly because the Reagan-Bush Republicans never managed to destroy all of the New Deal-Great Society safety net -- e.g., they never even contemplated getting rid of deposit insurance -- but also because the sheer size of the public sector dampened the disaster. As Krugman put it:
One downside of all this is that we're not as desperate for reform as we were in 1933 when Roosevelt became president. Exactly why is rather complicated -- Krugman's sense of our insensitivity to slowly mounting catastrophes is one part of the reason -- but one difference is that the reform president's hecklers this time are not just moaning. They're circling for the kill. Josh Marshall, at TPM, reports:
That may be true, but it seems perverse to entertain that thought, much less gloat over it. Health care is one of those frog boilers: in 1992 it was already scandalous that it consumed 14% of US GDP, but since then it has continued to gobble up the economy, now up to 16% of GDP. (What was it when Truman's first attempt was thwarted? 5-6%, I guess.) Absent significant reform, it only stands to keep growing, devouring more and more of the economy. At what level this becomes intolerable is hard to say. Evidently, the opponents of reform don't think the feel the water's heat yet, or are so preoccupied with the politics they don't care about the issues. Those who stand to profit from the status quo are one thing. For DeMint all that matters is making Obama look bad. The irony here is that the reason Obama would look so bad if he fails is precisely because the issue is so crucial. Reasonable people will blame opponents like DeMint if that happens, and give Obama another chance -- especially if he comes back with a stronger program (like single-payer) and takes it to the people. Saturday, June 27. 2009Taxes and Other LinksMatthew Yglesias: The Next Tax Revolt: Had this stuck in a window for a week now, and didn't want to lose it, even though I don't have time to dig into it. Interesting point:
One thing that seems to be a general rule of US tax policy is to make taxation as visible, and therefore as painful, as possible. This actually runs counter to one of the basic (and oft-repeated) considerations in taxation: the belief that taxes disincentivize behavior. This is even considered a selling point for sin taxes. But if taxes are such a drag on the economy, it would make much more sense to make them less visible, as well as to focus them on cases where disincentives are trivial or non-existent -- e.g., taxing dead people. For the living, the least painful time to tax is whenever a transaction occurs: when you buy and sell something, or when you pay someone a wage or other remuneration. With few (if any) exceptions, the robust tax base countries Yglesias favors raise most of their taxes through a VAT, which (unlike American sales taxes) is generally buried within the cost of the purchase. VATs raise prices, which has some negative effect on demand, but they don't hit you out of the blue like property taxes do. It also helps if the burden of tax collection is placed primarily on business, which used to be the case in the US but is less so now: it is both less visible to most people and it fits in with accounting procedures that businesses need to do anyway. I can't vouch for Yglesias's assertion that the US tax code is relatively progressive compared to other countries. One thing that is certain is that it is much less progressive than it used to be. There are a lot of ways that progressivism could be used that aren't now. In particular, I would make both corporate income and VAT taxes mildly progressive based on company size: a break for small and especially new competitors and a brake against WalMart-sized monopolies. I also think that unearned income -- interest, dividends, capital gains, gifts, estates -- should be taxed progressively according to total lifetime gains: a break for anyone starting to build a nest egg, and a brake on excessive accumulation. Of course, there's no point raising taxes unless you plan on spending the revenues on something useful. I can come up with a long list there, too -- subjects for many future posts. Getting ready to take a vacation of sorts. A long road trip, anyhow. Some interesting articles that I had kept open with some vague notion of writing something about them, but now will have to pack up:
By the way, Iraq is getting bloody again, with over 200 civilian deaths this past week. I've just slogged through Thomas Ricks's Surge-celebratory The Gamble, and it's worth noting that the intelligent people behind the strategem -- a group excluding politicians like McCain and Lieberman, pundits like Kristol, and self-appointed experts like Fred Kagan -- never saw as anything more than a beachhead that would depend on significant political reconciliation to secure. The latter didn't happen for a lot of reasons, and now it's closing. Of course some people, including Ricks in his prognosticating epilogue, will attribute this to the imminent US withdrawals, implying that we can fix the problem by launching Surge II. But the fact is that there will always be a day of reckoning when US forces leave, and putting that off tries the patience of everyone in Iraq who wants to get this war settled. The idea that Iraq is a "forever war" is stuck in the heads of a few American hawks who invested heavily in it, but it's plainly absurd to most Americans, who sooner or later will manage to pull the plug. When that happens, Iraq will sink or swim. I've always felt that Iraq's odds would be better if the country is not tied to the dead weight of American imperialism. Nothing that has happened, including the adjustments Petraeus and Odierno made, has changed that. |