Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor: Cobra II

I marked a few quotes while I was reading Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (2006, Pantheon). The book was written by Michael R. Gordon, a New York Times correspondent who was "embedded" in the operation's command headquarters, and Marine General Bernard E. Trainor. Gordon and Trainor had collaborated on a similar book about the 1990-91 Iraq, which had become the definitive inside story of that war. Gordon and Trainor had extraordinary access to US military sources involved in this war, including still classified debriefings of Iraqi military sources.

The quotes don't attempt to synopsize the book. They are, rather, items that I found particularly revealing.

Page 145-146:

Lieutenant Colonel Steven Peterson, one of Marks's planners, identified another problem with Eclipse II [McKiernan's postwar plan], one that went to the core of the CENTCOM plan and the effort to apply the principles of transformation in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. To encourage the collapse of Saddam's regime and speed the push to Baghdad, the air and ground campaign was designed to destroy the regime's command and control -- the "shock and awe" promised by Franks. Yet, some command and control was essential, for the postwar plan assumed that McKiernan would use Iraqi Regular Army forces, police, adn institutions tohelp maintain order. There was little in the way of a U.S. reserve should the Iraqis not be up to the task or could not be controlled. This contradiction and its potential to undermine U.S. postwar efforts were noted by Peterson in a classified assessment he prepared before the war.

"Over a month before the war began, the Phase IV planning group concluded that the campaign would produce conditions at odds with meeting strategic objectives," Peterson later wrote in an unpublished paper that he submitted to the National War College, course work that became the talk of military war colleges but was never noted by the media. "They realized that the joint campaign was specifically designed to break all control mechanisms of the regime and there would be a period following regime collapse in which we would face the greatest danger to our strategic objectives. This assessment described the risk of an influx of terrorists to Iraq, the rise of criminal activity, the probable actions of former regime members, and the loss of control of WMD that was believed to exist."

To hedge against the risk that a newly liberated Iraq could spin out of control and that WMD would go missing, Peterson and his fellow planners stressed the need to seal the borders, identify infrastructure that needed to be protected, and gather Iraqi troops and resources to quickly reestablish control of the country. But Peterson understood all too well that McKiernan had only a limited number of forces and was struggling to persuade Washington to send the reinforcements, military police, and support he believed were needed. Not even Peterson thought there were a lot of extra troops to take on the missions he foresaw for Phase IV. Zinni had based his old 1003 plan on the assumption that it took more troops to secure the peace than to upend Saddam's regime, and the rejection of that assumption had led to a dilemma. "No officer in the headquarters was prepared to argue for actions that would siphon resources from the war fighting effort, when the fighting had not yet begun," Peterson wrote. "The war was not yet started, let alone finished, when these issues were being raised. Only a fool would propose hurting the war fighting effort to address post-war conditions that might or might not occur."

Peterson's paper spoke volumes about the incessant pressure to fight the war with as few troops as possible, the military's unease about the outcome and its unwillingness to take a firm stand on troop requirements for a phase of the conflict that was replete with uncertainty. The military's reluctance to address this, Peterson concluded, was one of the biggest mistakes of the war.

In other words, there was an inherent contradiction between the goal of destroying Iraq's command and control and the need to use those same mechanisms to secure Iraq once the enemy was defeated. One alternative would have been to provide sufficient manpower to establish a new command and control system. How much manpower that might have actually taken had never been more than a wild guess in previous war plans -- I suspect that Zinni's 380,000 figure was better tuned to dissuading his hot-headed political bosses from doing something stupid than it was a careful estimate of the all the ways invasion of Iraq could go wrong.

The book discusses Rumsfeld's ideology of "transformation" -- the idea that employing more precision technology would make it possible for the US to fight wars with less manpower. Following this line of logic, Rumsfeld bullies Franks into radically reducing his manpower requests for the invasion of Iraq. One aspect of this is discussed: reduction in manpower reduces logistic requirements, which allows the US to deploy its forces faster. Not discussed is a much more important matter: in order to sell the war, Rumsfeld and his cabal had to make the war to be as painless and risk-free as possible. If the generals insisted on the originally planned troop levels or more that would tip the public off that occupation wouldn't be a cakewalk and arouse the opposition. Publicly airing the risks of occupation would risk the whole adventure. Accordingly, Rumsfeld had to not plan seriously for the occupation because any realistic plan would weaken the rush to war.

Ironically, the one part of the postwar plan they couldn't sandbag was WMD, since that was their cassus belli. Accordingly, any military planner was free to raise the question of what happens when Iraq's WMD are deployed in any context.

P. 152:

Though the particulars of his speech were misleading, Rumsfeld had given a surprisingly blunt and public explanation of the "enabling" philosophy of nation-building that he and Rice had trumpeted. In short, the war seemed like a win-win situation. The United States could oust a dictator, usher in a new era in Iraq, shift the balance of power in the Middle East in the United States's favor, all without America's committing itself to the lengthy, costly, and arduous peacekeeping and nation-building, which the Clinton administration had undertaken in Bosnia and Kosovo. The new policy would be best for both sides, Americans and Iraqis, or so the theory went.

Not everyone was as sanguine about the postwar scenario. Joe Collins, the Pentagon official who dealt with peacekeeping operations, was anxious about what might unfold. Collins was very much a supporter of the president, but he feared that the occupation might be much more burdensome than the White House anticipated. With the lean force the U.S. was sending, it would be hard to safeguard the vulnerable supply lines, he feared. Administering the peace could be more costly and problematic as well. Collins shared his worries with Elliott Abrams. The invasion, he fretted, might be the Bush administration's political undoing. "The way I do the math, Bush will be a one-term president," Collins said. "That's not the way Karl Rove sees it," Abrams quipped. The White House's political maestro had famously drafted a memo that predicted that the war could be a boon to the president's reelection effort, which, to the embarrassment of the White House, had leaked.

P. 168, just before the start of the war:

That evening, a Pentagon aide passed a message to a senior military public affairs officer in the Gulf from Torie Clarke, the Pentagon spokesperson. POTUS, the president of the United States, wanted the military to facilitate three types of news reports: of Iraqis celebrating the arrival of the victorious American troops, of allied shipments of humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi population, and of the newly discovered arsenals of WMD. The White House seemed secure in its cause and confident of victory. Bush was convinced that grateful Iraqis and disclosed WMD would provide the White House with the ultimate photo op.

The administration's allies in Washington were calm and confident. In a conference call with a Wall Street firm, Richard Perle predicted a quick war and an easy occupation. "There is no plan for an extended occupation in Iraq," Perle assured the investors. "The size of the force to maintain order will be much smaller than people believe."

The Iraqis, Perle said, would greet the Americans as liberators, and government functions would be turned over as quickly as possible. As for the Iraqi army, secret police, and intelligence services, "there will be a process akin to de-Nazification after World War II, in which we will attempt to identify and root out people who cannot be allowed to remain in authority."

The president's decision to invade would soon be vindicated. "There is no question that we will find weapons of mass destruction."

Page 436, after Baghdad fell:

Franks endorsed McKiernan's strategy and passed on his guidance in a video conference. As U.S. forces ventured north, Franks wanted them to cut off the pipeline that was transporting Iraqi crude to Syria. The Syrians had allowed foreign fighters to cross into Iraq and were no friends of the Pentagon. "Find out where the knobs are to shut off the oil to Syria -- they've been assholes, they continue to be assholes, so I want to turn off their oil," Franks said.

Franks also had another matter on his mind. With Saddam out of power, the Turkish government was beginning to complain that Turkomans in northern Iraq were being harassed by the new law in the area: the Kurds who were allied with the U.S. Franks had little sympathy for Ankara's position. "Tell the Turks they can kiss my ass," Franks said. The CENTCOM commander was still smarting from Turkey's refusal to let the coalition open a northern front. As for the enemy, Franks made it clear that the remaining pockets of Iraqi forces were to surrender promptly or be destroyed. "I'm interested in exploitation, in killing those who need to be killed and targeting wht needs to be targeted. Let the youngsters know that they should be as lethal as they need to be. We need to still be very much offensively inclined. The only negotiating we'll do is either you capitulate or we'll kill you. Don't get jerked around, be tough in negotiations, either you surrender or we kill you period."

P. 446-447. Tikrit had been secured by the Marines:

Nonetheless, Kelly decided he had entered the postwar phase of operations. He ordered his Marines to take off their flak jackets and helmets and circulate among the locals. An ad hoc Tikriti police force was organized. Vigilante checkpoints were disbanded. [ . . . ] Within a few days, [the Marines] received orders to turn over their area of operations to Ray Odierno's 4th ID. [ . . . ] Kelly believed he had already transitioned to postwar operations; Odierno thought that his late-arriving division was still in the combat phase of the campaign. Odierno had been told his mission was to attack north, seize the Iraqi military complex at Taji airfield at Balad, and then advance to Tikrit as quickly as possible.

Apache helicopters from the 4th ID flew into the Marines' battle space without coordination with Kelly's task force and began to strafe abandoned enemy armor, vehicles that were close to the Marine LAR units. Major Ben Connable of the Marines said that Odierno's staff "felt they were coming to Tikrit not to relieve us, but to rescue us." A draft history prepared by the 1st Marine division was equally critical. "US 4th ID had missed the combat phase of OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] and was determined to have a share in the 'fighting.' . . . . Stores that had reopened quickly closed back up as the people once again evacuated the streets, adjusting to the new security tactics. A budding cooperative environment between citizens and American forces was quickly snuffed out." According to the Marines, a senior officer with the 4th ID made it clear that the Army had a different prescription for Tikrit when he remarked, "The only thing these sand niggers understand is force and I'm about to introduce them to it."

It's worth recalling that Falluja broke into open revolt after a similar transfer of military authority. In general, rapid turnover of US forces meant that no matter how constructively one commander was able to work with local Iraqis, he would soon be replaced with someone clueless who would quickly undo whatever understanding had been established. This pattern was probably made worse by Rumsfeld's plans to understaff and quickly draw down US forces, but in many ways it's endemic to the way the US military is staffed and the expectations of its soldiers.

P. 461:

Tom White, the civilian Army secretary, had a less charitable view. "Rumsfeld just ground Franks down," White said. "If you grind away at the military guys long enough, they will finally say, 'Screw it, I'll do the best I can with what I have.' The nature of Rumsfeld is that you just get tired of arguing with him." Since Rumsfeld and his aides were determined to keep the American troop presence in Iraq to a minimum, the decision was all but pre-ordained. White explained, "Our working budgetary assumption was that ninety days after completion of the operation, we would withdraw the first fifty thousand and then every thirty days we'd take out another fifty thousand until everybody was back. The view was that whatever was left in Iraq would be de minimis.

Note that this is their "budgetary" model -- i.e., the one used to minimize the officially projected cost of the war, and therefore make it more palatable politically. This does not mean that they actually intended to withdraw all those troops. Otherwise, why would they be building all those "enduring camps"? The contradiction here follows the same pattern as previous contradictions.

P. 490, after Bremer took over:

To the south, Lieutenant Colonel Chris Conlin, whose battalion had taken the Crown Jewel [i.e., the oil fields] on the opening day of the invasion, was given authority for Najaf. Conlin arrived to discover that the CIA had installed a Sufi as mayor who not only was unpopular with the city's residents, but was receiving bad notices in the Western media. Soon word came down from Bremer's office that Conlin was to fire the mayor.

Conlin suggested that an election be held and Mattis's and Bremer's staffs endorsed the idea. The Marines and an Army reserve unit from Green Bay, Wisconsin, devised a plan to register the Iraqis and build wooden ballot boxes. The upcoming balloting stimulated enormous interest and intensive campaigning. The Shiites had been repressed for years by Saddam and now, having been liberated by the Americans, they would finally have an opportunity to govern themselves. Just a day before the registration process was formally to begin, however, Conlin received a call from Mattis. The election had to be canceled. Bremer was concerned that an unfriendly Islamic candidate would prevail.

P. 491-492, meanwhile in Falluja:

In the west, Buff Blount had sent Perkins's 2nd BCT to Fallujah to restore order after the 82nd and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment had come under attack. Perkins had an entire brigade of troops. The brigade also reached out to the Iraqis. Blount authorized the payment of "blood money" for the Iraqis who had been shot by the 82nd, hoping to head off further revenge killings. The division's soldiers sought to cooperate with the local imams and to train the police. By July, however, it was time for the 3rd ID to return to the United States.

But Blount was worried that the inroads his soldiers had made with the Iraqi population would be erased if his soldiers were replaced by troops from the 82nd, whom the residents of Fallujah still hated with a passion. Blount went to see Sanchez and explained the sensitivity of the situation. As much as Blount wanted to take his soldiers home, he offered to extend the 3rd ID deployment in Fallujah. If the 82nd returned, there would be fewer forces in the area and fewer soldiers with a history of trouble relations with the Iraqis.

Sanchez was not sympathetic. It was time for the 3rd ID to leave and the 82nd was the only unit that was available to take over. Within weeks of the 3rd ID's departure, the 82nd shot and killed some of the policemen the 3rd ID had worked so hard to train after mistaking them for Iraqi insurgents. Hostility against the Americans continued to grow in Fallujah.

Sanchez, by the way, spent the early war on a boat in the Mediterranean, his troops denied access to Iraq through Turkey. The generals who actually fought the war scattered quickly after "mission accomplished" -- leaving Sanchez with holding the bag. Sanchez was later largely responsible for the Abu Ghraib scandal.

These were just the sections that I marked as I was reading. I don't do that often; had I planned ahead I might have marked up a good deal more. For instance, Lt. General John Abizaid predicted that US forces would be an "antibody" in Iraq -- the closest thing to insight in the whole book -- then came up with various crackpot schemes to put Iraqi faces on the occupation. When General William Wallace made his famous comment about the enemy they were fighting not being the enemy they had wargamed against, Rumsfeld and Franks threw tantrums and tried to get Wallace relieved. It's still noteworthy that Franks was ordered to revise the previous (Zinni's) Iraq war plans back in Sept. 2001, immediately following 9/11, even with Afghanistan also on his plate. It's also noteworthy how hard Rumsfeld pushed to get postwar planning under DOD control and away from the State Department, especially given how little effort DOD actually made on such planning. The politics behind that, as well as the politics behind the appointment of Paul Bremer, were mostly off Gordon's radar, so barely appear here. The book itself ends very quickly after Bremer comes onto the scene, so the idea that this is the inside story of the occupation is a reach. Much more happened later, but arguably with the looting and the bomb attacks on the Jordanian embasy and the UN headquarters the die was already cast.

Whatever it was that the CIA was up to was also off the radar here, but one constant emerges: every piece of information that the authors report the CIA as providing turned out to be deadass wrong. No reason here not to refer to them as the Central Ignorance Agency. Meanwhile, the Defense Intelligence Agency has no presence whatsoever. As far as I can tell, the sole reason for their existence was to filter shit for use as propaganda, pretending that the Pentagon actually knew something. But as I said above, the Pentagon didn't want to know anything, because the only things they could have learned were things that would have made the war less attractive. Their sole idea was to sell the war, and the harder that became, the less truth they could afford to admit.

The book has had a role in recent debates over Rumsfeld's fitness to command, even though that is certainly not the primary interest of the authors. (At least half of the book is a blow-by-blow account of military operations from invasion up through capturing Baghdad. As far as I'm concerned, that's the boring half, but that's the side their bread is buttered on.) Still, the basic judgment one has to return is that Rumsfeld functioned solely as the advocate for the prowar position and never made any sort of fair and impartial effort at getting to the facts, asking the right questions, or drawing the right conclusions. If he worked for me, I'd sure fire his ass. If the Democrats win control of congress later this year and want to sharpen up their knives with an impeachment project, Rumsfeld looks to me like the juiciest turkey to start carving on. But I suspect that his political goal is no different from Cheney's or Bush's, so he merely practiced his deceit and corruption in his ledership's interest. None of the troika really suffice as fall guys for the others.

The book also doesn't comprehensively focus on Franks, but it does do a pretty good job of making him look as dumb as he once said Douglas Feith is. That's cutting it pretty deep. As for the rest of the military brass, the book means to make them look good, but what they're good for is hard to say. Shooting ducks in barrels, fine. But they can't conquer a two-bit country without turning it to shit, which means that as an imperial legion they're worthless. Worse than worthless, in that all they do is make things worse. Anyone with the least critical instincts should have been able to recognize their shortcomings before they were deployed. Madeleine Albright once asked what's the point of having this extraordinary military if we never use it. The correct answer is that there is no point. It's just meant to be admired and feared. Use it and you lose it, which is pretty much what's happened.

One last point: Cobra II was the war plan, named in honor of Patton's WWII campaign across Europe. As the Perle quote shows, the architects of this war saw it as restoring the glory accrued to the US in fighting the original Axis of Evil. The persistence of WWII metaphors is an interesting psychopathology -- something that will be amusing to chew over once the wars themselves are put to rest. One wonders, for instance, whether this might be rooted in Israel's primal obsession with the Nazis. Or whether it's just a subconscious way of avoiding comparisons that would soon become obvious: Vietnam.

posted 2006-05-24