Avner Offer: The Challenge of Affluence

Avner Offer, The Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being int he United States and Britain Since 1950 (2007, Oxford University Press)

In his Oct. 11, 2007 New York Review of Books piece ("They'd Much Rather Be Rich"), Andrew Hacker writes of Avner Offer's book, The Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States and Britain Since 1950 (2007, Oxford University Press):

"I've been rich, and I've been poor," the cabaret entertainer Sophie Tucker was once heard to say, famously adding, "and believe me, rich is better." Avner Offer disagrees. In his view, the spread of affluence not only corrupts character, but has caused al these disorders and discontents:

family breakdown, addiction, stress, road and landscape congestion, obesity, poverty, denial of health care, mental disorder, violence, economic fraud, and insecurity.

He cites surveys in which today's Americans declare themselves unhappier than their parents were. Young people who earlier heeded their elders are now prone to "intoxicating short-term dissipation." Offer argues that advertising, by flaunting what we don't have, is a major cause of malaise. His book's most vivid examples come from the research at Duke University's Hartman Center for Sales, Advertising, and Marketing. Recurrent pitches, for example, have insidious effects: "By saturating the public domain with false sincerity, advertising makes genuine sincerity more difficult."

Moreover, he writes, "affluence breeds impatience," whereas more modest degrees of wealth fostered "reciprocity and commitment." Modern marriages are like products purchased at the mall: turn them in if they don't work out. Using statistics from Nigeria and Lebanon, he finds a link between low incomes and family bonds. But he can also get the figures wrong, as when he writes that cohabiting couples have less sex than their married counterparts. In fact, the study he cites found the former to be considerably more active, which is what most of us might expect.

While Offer doesn't define "affluence," his book focuses on how rising income affects ordinary people. The average American family now has two and a half times the purchasing power of its 1947 counterpart. Affluence for such a family isn't wealth; many have heavy debts and are unprepared for calamities. But they frequent suburban malls, crowd the nation's airports, and are helping their children through college. Offer's statistics suggest that at least two thirds of Americans are in this pool, whereas in 1947 only one in three were.

Early in The Challenge of Affluence, a predictable thought arises: weren't indigence and diseases common in pre-affluent periods? Yet Offer, who is Oxford's Chichele Professor of Economic History, says little about the past. In New York City, at the start of the last century, one fifth of all babies died before reaching the age of six. Tuberculosis was rampant in the tenements, and very often fatal. Altogether, fewer than 2 percent of New Yorkers survived to celebrate their seventieth birthday -- the kind of fact Offer fails to consider. Yet on one count, Offer is correct: nuptials were taken seriously. The 1910 Census found only 8,292 divorced men and women, against the 1,805,335 who were married. Today's divorce ratio is forty times higher.

Offer's chief concern isn't with the very rich who have always lived lavishly. Rather, he focuses on how a half-century of abundance in the United States has fomented a "self-regarding individualism" in the new majority who now share in its largess. He concludes, contra Sophie Tucker, that more money in more pockets hasn't increased the gross domestic happiness, although he grants that better-paid men and women exercise more and smoke less. [ . . . ]

Rising real incomes, Offer concludes, lead to "self-defeating choices." His examples range from undersaving and gambling to obesity and infidelity. He cites the less-affluent British, who show more patience and restraint, owing to their "class barriers," which restrain personal aspirations. His basic criticism of Americans is that they have a greater sense of entitlement than their British cousins do. In fact, those feelings -- coupled with a propensity for purchasing -- have been around for a long time, including during the less prosperous periods Offer cites. Alexander Hamilton urged citizens to take a second job, "as a resource for multiplying their acquisitions or their enjoyments." Somewhat later, Alexis de Toqueville noted prosperity's untoward effects, especially in "that strange melancholy which often haunts the inhabitants of democratic countries in the midst of their abundance." Offer is convincing when he argues that the emphasis on acquisition serves to accentuate the poverty of the minorities left behind, whether in New York in 1900 or more recently in New York in 1900 or more recently in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. If American affluence goes back a long way, it also remains the overriding reason why so many people want to come here.

While psychology may be less methodical than economics, an analysis of the urge to spend needs to delve into people's minds. I wish Offer had tried to say more about motives. All this purchasing involves more than keeping up with neighbors or impressing rivals we don't like. Rather, Hamilton's "acquisitions and enjoyments" help us to delineate who we are. Most of us, including philosophers and poets, use what we wear or where we take vacations to express or confirm our identities. But does this mean the richer we are, the more dimensions of experience we discover? Offer would say no. But of course he can't know about the inner lives of many citizens. Who can?

This doesn't quite inspire me to run out and buy a $45 hardcover book, and not just because I'm still stuck in the mindset that we're not really as affluent as people seem to think -- maybe something due to habits my parents developed during the Great Depression and WWII. The bigger problem is likely to be the confusion in the book, but I'm still intrigued, because the relationship between affluence and, for lack of a better word, happiness does seem to be fitful. Moreover, it suggests further problems: if we're unable to convert ascending affluence into happiness, how much worse is it going to be when we bumps up against material limits?

posted 2007-10-12