Gaza War Peace Plan
Twenty Trump points, for better or worse.
On September 29, 2025, Trump announced a 20-point proposal for
a ceasefire to Israel's war against Gaza and some kind of postwar
settlement. Wikipedia originally titled their piece on this as
"Donald Trump's September 2025 Gaza Strip proposal." As Hamas and
Israel have subsequently agreed to parts of the proposal, Wikipedia
renamed their entry
Gaza war peace plan. That seems like a fair label, so we'll
use it here, but the word a sharp editor is most likely to excise
is "peace," as there is still a very large gap between halting
military engagement (not much more than a ceasefire) and real
peace.
We should be clear what real peace is: a state where all parties
feel safe and secure in their homes and work, and can reasonably
expect that any disputes or disruptions will be dealt with in a
fair and just manner. By this definition, both Palestinians and
Israelis have enjoyed little if any peace since 1948. One should
note the obvious: that the frequency and severity of actual
and implicit violence has been overwhelmingly directed by Israelis
against Palestinians. Even if you're an "eye for an eye" type of
person, the slaughter of Israeli civilians on October 7, 2023,
didn't require retribution: it was paid for long in advance. Since
then, Israel's destruction of Gaza has been unprecedentedly
disproportionate. If the word "genocide" is to have any meaning
whatsoever, it describes Israel's amalgam of
targeted assassination, indiscriminate killing, and systematic
efforts to render Gaza uninhabitable — especially its
devastation of agriculture, of health care, of utilities, and
its cruel blockades of food and supplies, plainly intended to
starve people and make them more vulnerable to disease.
I want to write about what a real peace plan might look like,
not in an ideal world but in the extremely flawed one
that Israel above all (but not alone) has painstakingly created.
But before we get into that, we should first consider the plan
as Trump proposed it, and especially the subset that Hamas has
agreed to, because this is real but also for what it reveals of
the mindsets of those involved. As is so often the case, the
mindset is most of the problem.
The Plan Outline
So what follows is a listing of the original plan points, drawn
from the Wikipedia article, with the point in bold, followed by my
notes.
Gaza will be a deradicalized terror-free zone that does not
pose a threat to its neighbors.
Israel should also become a "deradicalized terror-free zone" and
not a threat to its neighbors (or its own people), and some of its
neighbors could also stand some improvement in this regard. That
this isn't a mutual requirement just reminds us that this isn't an
attempt to negotiate terms that all parties can come to see as
equally fair and jointly positive. Israel has all the power, Gaza
has none, and the plan is to keep it that way: to secure Israeli
power, and to institutionalize Palestinian powerlessness.
Still, the people of Gaza should welcome this, especially as
"terror-free zone" starts with freedom from Israeli terror. What
they call "radicalization" is a normal human response to terror:
the desperate will to fight back, especially in the absence of a
justice system that can be trusted to defend them. Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of
Gaza, who have suffered more than enough.
The passive construction here is telling. Gaza will not be free
to develop as its people see fit. Development will be dictated by
the powers establishing this plan, according to their estimates of
what benefits the people of Gaza have suffered enough to deserve.
On the other hand, the assertion that Gaza should be developed
for the people who live there is a strong rejection of Israel's
manifest policy, which has been to destroy everything, and kill
everyone who doesn't leave first, ultimately seizing the wasteland
as Israeli Lebensraum. If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will
immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed upon line
to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military
operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be
suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are
met for the complete staged withdrawal.
The word "suspended" sounds ominous here, as if Israel is already
planning a resumption of bombing and shelling. Note that the withdrawal
line proposed is still well within Gaza. This shouldn't be a problem
initially, but withdrawal to the Green Line would be viewed as fairer,
and would reduce potential conflict points. It's hard to define
"complete" as meaning anything else.
We should beware that Israel may read this as only applying until
the hostage release, leaving Israel free to resume operations and to
advance troops whenever it sees fit. It should be clarified that this
really does mean that "the war will immediately end" and stay ended. Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement,
all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned.
By "hostages" they are referring to Israelis held by Hamas.
Palestinians being held for exchange are termed differently.
I'm suspicious of the focus on "deceased hostages" here. While
I understand Israel's desire for a full forensic accounting of
any hostages not returned alive, I wonder why these deadlines
are so tight and arbitrary, and suspect that these conditions
are phrased this way to make it easier for Israel to abrogate
the agreement. [PS: Israel has already cited this clause as
reason to further restrict aid.]
I was surprised to see that the number of surviving "hostages"
has dwindled to 20 (out of 251 initially, with 105 released in
2023, and a few more on later dates. It's not clear whether the
hostage-taking did Hamas any good. Israel applied its "Hannibal
Doctrine" to kill Israelis rather than let them be captured, so
it shouldn't be surprising that they've made little effort to
keep from killing hostages. They've also made little effort to
negotiate for hostage release, and in any case they've accelerated
their own hostage-taking. (They also appear to have been hoarding
bodies for possible exchange.) It is true that political opposition
to Netanyahu has centered around prioritizing hostage release, and
Americans (Biden more than Trump) have been sensitive to the issue,
leading to what few ceasefires have transpired. On the other hand,
the "hostages" were propaganda tools for Israel in justifying their
massive retribution, and that seems to have played especially well
in America. Once all hostages are released, Israel will release 250 life
sentence prisoners plus 1700 Gazans who were detained after October 7,
2023, including all women and children detained in that context. For
every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release
the remains of 15 deceased Gazans.
There are about 11,000 Palestinians currently imprisoned by Israel,
many uncharged let alone not legally convicted of any offense, and
many of them were simply snatched by Israel to stock up for hostage
exchange. For Israel, Palestinian prisoners are an always sustainable
resource. Once all hostages are returned, Hamas members who commit to
peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons will be given
amnesty. Members of Hamas who wish to leave Gaza will be provided safe
passage to receiving countries.
There should also be reassurances that Israel will not target
former Hamas members, or any other Palestinians, either remaining
in Gaza, elsewhere in Israeli-occupied territories, or abroad.
Israel has a long history of extrajudicial assassinations, so this
is a very legitimate concern. Upon acceptance of this agreement, full aid will be
immediately sent into the Gaza Strip. At a minimum, aid quantities
will be consistent with what was included in the January 19, 2025,
agreement regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of
infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of
hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove
rubble and open roads.
The "minimum" levels are almost certainly inadequate, but the
overall intent here is good. Still, the amount of damage to be
repaired is staggering, and most people will be shocked as it is
revealed. And it will be, because we've never been better equipped
or more motivated to show what has happened and to document the
"human interest" stories behind it.
The "Jan. 19, 2025 agreement" is described in Wikipedia as
January 2025 Gaza war ceasefire. This was negotiated during the
waning days of the Biden administration, a multi-stage deal where
33 hostages were released in the first stage. After Trump became
president, Netanyahu broke the agreement, so the second and third
stages were never implemented. I haven't checked the details where
referred to here and below, but they probably leave much to be
desired, and were included here simply to build on the previous
agreement. Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed
without interference from the two parties through the United Nations
and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other
international institutions not associated in any manner with either
party. Opening the Rafah crossing in both directions will be subject
to the same mechanism implemented under the January 19, 2025,
agreement.
This is reasonable given that such organizations exist and have
decent reputations. The mechanisms of the prior agreement may be
inadequate, but offer a starting point. Gaza will be governed under the temporary transitional
governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee,
responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services
and municipalities for the people in Gaza. This committee will be made
up of qualified Palestinians and international experts, with oversight
and supervision by a new international transitional body, the "Board
of Peace", which will be headed and chaired by President Donald
J. Trump, with other members and heads of State to be announced,
including former prime minister Tony Blair. This body will set the
framework and handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza until
such time as the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform
program, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump's
peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French proposal, and can securely
and effectively take back control of Gaza. This body will call on
best international standards to create modern and efficient governance
that serves the people of Gaza and is conducive to attracting
investment.
While some sort of oversight committee is necessary in the short
term, the names given aren't reassuring, especially given their
longstanding political ties to Israel. Putting Trump in charge of
humanitarian efforts pretty much promises that the process will be
corrupt, ineffective, and aggravating. Few if any of the people
affected, and for that matter few people around the world, will
find this reassuring. Trump's insertion of military
forces in US cities is a dangerous model (to some extent inspired by
Israel's own policing tactics).
Also troubling is the proposed role
for the ("reformed") Palestinian Authority, which is already regarded
as little more than a subcontractor for Israeli occupation — a
role the PA will continue to play in the West Bank. Few points are
more important, or should be more obvious, than that Israel should
have no direct role in the postwar administration of Gaza, or even
be suspected of indirect influence.
The focus on "attracting investment" here suggests a vision for
Gaza unlikely to be shared by the people of Gaza, and in any case
is premature until the peaceful foundations for economic development
are established. The involvement of Trump & co. is suspicious
(although they're so crooked it's unlikely they would approve a
plan that doesn't promise them profit).
While the very idea would be anathema to the people dictating
terms here, the best model for organizing Gaza would be as a social
welfare state, with massive inputs of resources directed through
a central and/or local authorities, governed democratically and
dedicated to public service, which would provide constructive work
for everyone. This could then be supplemented by private sector
economic development. A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energize
Gaza will be created by convening a panel of experts who have helped
birth some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle
East. Many thoughtful investment proposals and exciting development
ideas have been crafted by well-meaning international groups, and will
be considered to synthesize the security and governance frameworks to
attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs,
opportunity, and hope for future Gaza.
Again, the key thing here is establishment of a representative
government of the people of Gaza, fully independent of Israel.
Otherwise there is likely to be a massive mismatch between what
outside capital fancy and what the people of Gaza need. A special economic zone will be established with preferred
tariff and access rates to be negotiated with participating
countries.
It wouldn't be a bad thing to set this up on terms favorable to
private sector development in Gaza, but "special economic zone" is
more often just code for exploitation and financial chicanery. One
should be skeptical here, given the people who are pushing this.
Quinn Slobodian's book Crack-Up Capitalism has many examples
of the perils of "special economic zones." No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to
leave will be free to do so and free to return. We will encourage
people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better
Gaza.
This is an important point, and a major departure from Israel's
manifest policy. This depends on the sovereignty of Gaza, including
its complete independence from Israel, and for that matter from all
other nations. Hamas and other factions agree to not have any role in the
governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form. All
military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and
weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There
will be a process of demilitarization of Gaza under the supervision of
independent monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently
beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning, and supported
by an internationally funded buy back and reintegration program all
verified by the independent monitors. New Gaza will be fully committed
to building a prosperous economy and to peaceful coexistence with
their neighbors.
I like this, but should note that this depends on a defense strategy
that no neighboring country (least of all Israel) subscribes to. Given
that Gaza currently has no defense, and no way to arm one, this is
largely an attempt to make a virtue out of necessity. But long range
it depends on security guarantees from and/or against Israel, which
run against long-term policy. On the other hand, if disarmament is
proven to be a viable path to peace — and we know from painful
experience that arming to deter Israeli aggression doesn't work —
this could be adopted more widely (e.g., by Hizbullah in Lebanon).
Also note that while it is reasonable to abolish Hamas, and I
would extend this to all other previous political organizations,
past membership in any organization should not ban that person from
serving in any government and/or political capacity. (The recent US
examples of Iraq and Afghanistan show that this not only penalizes
competent people but can easily drive them into armed opposition.
The oft-cited denazification process in post-WWII Germany barely
scratched the surface, and was quickly forgotten. Real denazification
didn't happen until the 1960s, based on the reflection of young Germans
and untainted by an occupying power.) A guarantee will be provided by regional partners to ensure
that Hamas, and the factions, comply with their obligations and that
New Gaza poses no threat to its neighbors or its people.
This is asking for something that Israel, with an overwhelming
force advantage, has failed at for nearly 80 years. The only real
way to ensure peace is to address the injustices that give people
little option but to resist, and to allow them peaceful paths to
redress grievances. If you do that, you won't need the kind of force
envisioned here (which in any case, especially if foreign directed,
is unlikely to work, and very likely to provoke). The United States will work with Arab and international
partners to develop a temporary International Stabilization Force
(ISF) to immediately deploy in Gaza. The ISF will train and provide
support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza, and will consult
with Jordan and Egypt who have extensive experience in this
field. This force will be the long-term internal security
solution. The ISF will work with Israel and Egypt to help secure
border areas, along with newly trained Palestinian police forces. It
is critical to prevent munitions from entering Gaza and to facilitate
the rapid and secure flow of goods to rebuild and revitalize Gaza. A
deconfliction mechanism will be agreed upon by the parties.
They make this sound like a proxy occupation force. While something
like this may be useful in the short term (not least to allay Israeli
and possibly Egyptian fears), the intention should be to make it as
lightweight and integrated into self-government and civil society as
possible. While training Palestinian police can be useful, it should
be clear that they work for their own people, and not for outsiders.
I do recognize that the transition from terror to peace, with
little or no effective order, will be fraught with risks. Looting
and score settling have often accompanied similar transitions in
the past, and Gaza is, if anything, even more disorganized and
desperate. So the idea that one could quickly stand up this ISF is
urgently attractive, but it would be very surprising if this ISF
possessed anything remotely resembling the skills and discipline
to do this job. Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. As the ISF establishes
control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw
based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to
demilitarization that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF, the
guarantors, and the United States, with the objective of a secure Gaza
that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its
citizens. Practically, the IDF will progressively hand over the Gaza
territory it occupies to the ISF according to an agreement they will
make with the transitional authority until they are withdrawn
completely from Gaza, save for a security perimeter presence that will
remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror
threat.
The open-endedness of the wording here allows for considerable
backsliding and even sabotage by Israel. The map associated with
withdrawal seems to allow Israel to retain a perimeter within Gaza
indefinitely. If so, this, like Israel's retention of Bekaa Farms
in Lebanon, would only serve to irritate the situation. While much
of the wording here and elsewhere seems designed to assuage Israeli
fears — really just rationalizations for continued war —
we should be clear that the key to successful pacification of Gaza
is ending Israel's control over the lives of its inhabitants. In the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the
above, including the scaled-up aid operation, will proceed in the
terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF.
More unnecessary cadging to humor Israel, although note that
this actually limits what Israel can claim.. An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on
the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change
mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing
the benefits that can be derived from peace.
This seems like a joke. It certainly isn't necessary, although
one might note that an openness to common secular currents, like
liberalism, humanism, socialism, and most ideas of international
law all point to the same goals, without the mystique of religion.
However, those who do
wish to prioritize their religious beliefs can find ample guidance
in their teachings if they bother to look. In particular, note that
Islam, which first developed in societies with substantial numbers
of Christians and Jews, successfully adopted values of "tolerance
and peaceful co-existence" from the start, and maintained them for
centuries, until European imperialists introduced their
divide-and-conquer schemes to foment secular hostility. While Gaza re-development advances and when the PA reform
program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in
place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and
statehood, which we recognize as the aspiration of the Palestinian
people.
While it would be straightforward for Israel to quit Gaza, and
allow a democratic state of its residents to self-rule there, the
situation in the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights is
much more complicated and intertwined, and Israeli desires to
retain power there are much more firmly set, and are well beyond
the requirements of ending the war in Gaza. Israel has been dead
set against any form of "two-state solution" since the Allon Plan
took shape in 1967, and any suggestion that they might go along
with such a plan were nothing more than blowing smoke. Having
achieved a genocidal degree of dominance, they are not about to
change here (although they know by now that dissembling is a
cheap and effective distraction).
While quitting Gaza would solve one part of Israel's demographic
problem (the hated presence of Palestinians in their midst), the
situation persists in the occupied territories and within Israel
proper. That much is beyond the scope of what needs to be done
with Gaza — which is why we must stress again the importance
of separating Gaza from other Israeli/Palestinian issues. But we
should not forget that Israel's treatment of its
Palestinian inhabitants in many cases constitutes a crime against
humanity, which is something that the world should take note of
and organize against. Until Israel stops and makes amends, this
will continue to be a serious issue. When Israel is ready to face up
to this matter, there are various ways to go about addressing it
(including, but not limited to, division into two states; indeed,
the assumption behind the "two-state solution" is the belief that
the "Jewish State" is too racist and rigid to tolerate equal
treatment of anyone else; as such, those who advocate such a
"solution" are implicitly affirming Israel's intrinsic injustice). The United States will establish a dialogue between Israel
and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and
prosperous co-existence.
The US has never been necessary for this, and has rarely if ever
been helpful, given that Americans are often even more deluded both about
themselves and others than anyone else. When/if Israel wants "peaceful
and prosperous co-existence," they know what to do. The only reason
to get the Americans involved is to shake them down for money, or to
set up an excuse for failure. We've seen many examples of both.
On the other hand, this does acknowledge that the issues disputed
between Israelis and Palestinians extend beyond Gaza, and need to be
dealt with in future forums. I could be good for the US to be involved
in this process, but only if American leadership develops a new faith
in equality, justice, freedom, and international law. There is little
evidence of that to date, which is part of why the US only seems to
enter into these discussions as extra Israeli muscle.
A Few Parting Notes
Initial reports were that Hamas had accepted the first nine points,
while arguing that they were just one faction among a broader people
that should be involved in any longer term settlement. Indeed, beyond
their claim on the hostages and their ability to negotiate in Qatar,
it's unclear that there is any effective Hamas organization left in
Gaza. As Netanyahu's avowed war aim was to "destroy Hamas," he's
needed to keep Hamas visible, which is until now about all the
hostage negotiations accomplished.
I'm reviewing the commentary on this for Loose Tabs, and will
have more comments there, as well as a follow up to this post. But
this plan does seem to be happening. On October 13, Hamas released
the last 20 Israeli "hostages," and Israel released a substantial
number of Palestinian prisoners, some in Ramallah and others in Gaza
(Khan Younis). Trump gave a speech to Israel's Knesset, and has
flown on to Egypt for further negotiations (while Netanyahu
stayed in Jerusalem, happy to appear as disengaged as possible).
At present, the only things agreed to are:
a ceasefire; the exchanges; a partial Israeli withdrawal; allowing
increased aid to enter. Those are the bare necessities, and will
be for quite some time. The "Gaza war peace plan," despite the
arrogance and vanity of its framers, at least stops the war, which
is the single most important fact: only from peace can only return
to normal life be possible. It also offers some promises, like no
expulsion or annexing, freedom to leave and return, and vague
promises for rebuilding, that bode well for later on. (By the
way, these points are a major departure from
Donald Trump's February 2025 Gaza Strip proposal, which
called for Palestinians to be transferred out of Gaza, with the
land turned over to Trump for development of luxury hotels;
Netanyahu readily agreed, while pretty much everyone else was
aghast, so that proposal died instantly. But it should be taken
as a cautionary warning about Trump's mindset.)
What still needs to be negotiated is: Israel's definitive exit
from Gaza (really, nothing less will do); temporary organization
and security within Gaza; standing up democratic self-governance;
opening for trade; financing for rebuilding. Those are big topics,
which will take a while. The keys there are that Israel be pushed
aside, so it has nothing to do with the future of Gaza (at least
until such a time as the people of Gaza decide they want to deal
with Israel, which won't be soon and may be never). And as soon as
possible, the people of Gaza, through new representative political
organization, be trusted to drive this process (within guidelines
like disarmament, and I would add human rights and some vigilance
against corruption). The plan as presented above errs way too far
on the side of indulging the prejudices and fantasies of selected
foreign countries.
While this plan is a welcome first step toward ending this horrible
war, I have some further thoughts on better ways to go about moving
forward. I'll write them up in a second post, out soon.
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